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FOREWORD
As N. A. M. Rodger says in his prize lecture in this volume, “Recent or distant, his-
tory is all we have to go on, and we cannot escape it.” Here at the Naval War College, 
we know better than to try to escape history; instead, we embrace it. The study of his-
tory broadens our horizons. It exposes us to people, places, and experiences that are 
otherwise inaccessible, and in doing so it builds our strategic and cultural perspec-
tive. I use that last phrase deliberately, because it forms the heart of the mission 
statement of the Naval War College. The College educates and develops future lead-
ers through the process of broadening their perspectives. It fosters a commitment 
to lifelong learning and prepares them to lead in the Cognitive Age. Thus, history 
forms an integral part of the College’s purpose. We promote its study, engage with 
its lessons, and expose our students to the benefits of its unique perspectives.
The publication of the first four Hattendorf Prize lectures demonstrates the es-
sential value of historical scholarship to the College’s mission. The Hattendorf Prize 
is the most prestigious award that any scholar can receive in the fields of maritime 
or naval history, and it serves as a beacon to encourage new scholarship in these 
important fields. An indication of the importance of the award is that it has been 
awarded once by the Secretary of the Navy at graduation and twice by the Chief of 
Naval Operations in person at the College’s flagship international event, the bien-
nial International Seapower Symposium (ISS). The world’s leading naval gathering, 
ISS brings together chiefs of navies and coast guards from around the globe to dis-
cuss common challenges and identify opportunities for cooperation. The prize re-
cipients are leading members of the international academic community, and their 
presence at ISS has reinforced the College’s commitment to international coopera-
tion, as well as the College’s mission of educating naval leaders about history and 
strategy.
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The award’s namesake, Professor Emeritus John B. Hattendorf, embodies its 
values. During his many years of service as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor 
of Maritime History, John conducted the kind of archival research that shapes our 
current understanding of the purpose and mission of the College. His career has 
served as a model for the prize criteria: to serve the Navy by improving the quality 
and range of scholarship in maritime history; to engage globally, with an apprecia-
tion for scholarship in different languages and from different national, cultural, and 
regional perspectives; and to see maritime history as a broad field in global his-
tory, one that builds on insights that cut across traditional academic and national 
boundaries.
John is the lead author of the wonderfully readable centennial history of the 
College, Sailors and Scholars. In reading it before my arrival in Newport this sum-
mer, I was struck by his description of the College’s earliest days. At the College’s 
formal opening ceremony on September 4, 1885, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, the 
founder and first President, told his audience that the College had no money for 
books, furniture, heat, or light. It was housed in the former Newport poorhouse, 
which offered little more than shelter from the winds off Narragansett Bay. Yet Luce 
was confident that his project was worthwhile and that support for it would follow.
Well over a century later, we can only marvel at how far the College has come. 
Where Luce once worried about the very survival of the institution, we now play 
host to the world’s leading scholars, alongside chiefs of navies. We also recently 
hosted the Navy’s new Chief Learning Officer, highlighting the importance of the 
College for the future of naval education. The Department of the Navy’s recent 
Education for Seapower (E4S) report argues that the education of our force is vital 
for national security. Reflecting this renewed emphasis on education, the College 
is investing in its own future by renovating Sims Hall and making other capital 
improvements.
The Hattendorf Prize demonstrates the viability of Luce’s vision and exempli-
fies the role that scholarship can play in supporting the mission of the U.S. Navy 
and its partners. For Luce, the College was to be “a place of original research on all 
questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the preven-
tion of war.” We begin every academic year at the College with these words, they 
feature prominently on the College’s website, and we frequently refer to them in 
College publications. But as with any motto, the more the words are repeated, the 
easier it is to forget their meaning. The publication of these prize lectures should 
cause us to consider these words anew. The distinguished scholars honored here 
embody Luce’s call. They have conducted original research of the highest quality 
in naval history and its role in contemporary debates, and by bringing them to the 
College the Hattendorf Prize has fortified the College’s purpose as the U.S. Navy’s 
essential connection between the sea services and academics. These stimulating 
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lectures remind us of the educational mission of the College and exemplify the 
value of connecting scholars and practitioners. It is my great personal pleasure to 
commend these lectures to you.
Shoshana S. Chatfield
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College





The publication of the first four John B. Hattendorf Prize Lectures presents an 
opportunity to revisit the original criteria for the award. Developed with the 
support of Rear Admiral Roger Nolan and the Naval War College Foundation in 
2011, the prize is accompanied by ten thousand dollars and a medal cast in bronze. 
It is awarded for distinguished academic achievement that contributes to a deep-
er understanding of the uses of sea services in history. From the outset, it was 
intended to be international, so as to encourage a global perspective on maritime 
affairs. It can be given either for a single work or for a sustained body of scholarly 
achievement over many years.
It is noteworthy how the selection committees have interpreted these last two 
criteria. Not only are the four scholars honored so far not American citizens, 
but they also write about topics other than the history of the U.S. Navy. All four 
earned the prize on the basis of many decades of scholarship rather than a single 
work. In both respects, these honorees reflect the scholarship and values of the 
award’s namesake, John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus at the 
Naval War College. As John’s students and colleagues know, he constantly seeks an 
international perspective by engaging with scholars around the world and working 
in many languages. He has written and edited dozens of books and many more 
articles and chapters on a range of subjects—all of which make him worthy of his 
own lifetime achievement award.
All four of the honorees whose lectures are included in this collection are from 
the same generation as the prize’s namesake: all were born in the decade beginning 
in 1939 (Werner Rahn in 1939, John Hattendorf 1941, Geoffrey Till and Paul Ken-
nedy 1945, N. A. M. Rodger 1949) and came of scholarly age in the 1970s. This 
collection presents an opportunity to reflect on the influences and achievements 
of that generation.
Paul Kennedy’s lecture, in particular, marks a return to his roots. By ranging 
widely over three great world wars and emphasizing the structural factors that 
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shaped naval affairs, especially geography and economics, his lecture recalls the 
publication in 1976 of the work that first made his name, The Rise and Fall of British 
Naval Mastery. It is difficult to overstate the influence of this book on the field of 
naval history. Nicholas A. M. Rodger, in an otherwise acerbic annotated bibliog-
raphy, called it a “classic history.”1 Indeed, British Naval Mastery was in many ways 
responsible for reestablishing the field of naval history within academia. In the de-
cades before its publication, the titans of the first half of the twentieth century—Al-
fred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and others—had been succeeded by a gen-
eration of historians shaped by the Second World War: Robert G. Albion, Samuel 
Eliot Morison, Stephen Roskill, Arthur Marder, and others. After 1945, those in the 
latter group published extensively on the conduct of the war at sea, authoring the 
official histories, engaging in fierce debates, and shaping public perception of the 
war. Yet by the early 1970s, naval history had come to be seen as a backwater of 
purely operational histories, chronicling one battle after another. Although this 
perception was slightly unfair, Kennedy’s British Naval Mastery demonstrated that 
naval history could be much more.
In his prize lecture, Kennedy’s characteristic approach comes through in the 
opening paragraphs. Despite being the recipient of an award in maritime history, 
he explicitly seeks to explain the limitations of sea power. He spends most of his 
energy on the periods between the three great wars of 1793–1815, 1914–18, and 
1939–45, and suggests that the subtitle of his piece should be Sea Power in an Age 
of Change. What motivates his analysis is not the tactics used at Trafalgar or Jut-
land but the Industrial Revolution that occurred in between. How, he asks, did sea 
power play a pivotal role in the first and third wars, but not (he suggests) in the 
second? His answer weaves together multiple strands: technological changes that 
influenced operational capabilities, the geopolitics of the coalitions in each war, 
and the acceleration of relative economic changes in wartime. Naval history there-
fore is only partially about ships at sea, and has at least as much to do with finance 
as with gunnery tactics.
Werner Rahn also looks beyond the traditional topics of naval history in ex-
amining the ebbs and flows of German naval affairs over a century and a half. In 
building a great battle fleet on the eve of the First World War, German planners 
ignored the geographical constraints of Germany’s location in the North Sea. When 
war came and the High Seas Fleet was contained, the only apparent alternative was 
submarine warfare; but this raised more questions than it answered. Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg worried that a reliance on U-boats “would claim as a stake our 
existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety.” This is not 
the language of the navalists. Rahn highlights the limitations of sea power much 
as Kennedy does. By risking American entry into the war—both times—German 
naval strategists played directly into the underlying relative economic strengths of 
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their enemies. In both Rahn’s and Kennedy’s lectures, we can hear the echoes of 
Kennedy’s best seller, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), and we can see 
its origins in naval history. To reiterate: sea power depends on economic power.
Both Kennedy and Rahn demonstrate how historians can speak to navies. Ken-
nedy does so by encouraging naval officers to think beyond the narrow confines 
of their professional lives and understand how sea power should be integrated into 
larger national strategies. Before launching into his survey, Rahn emphasizes that 
the public and naval personnel are interested in the past, and it is essential that 
historians inform them about it without sacrificing complexity.
If Rahn and Kennedy show historians how to speak to navies and show navies 
the value of history, Nicholas Rodger and Geoffrey Till are much more blunt: they 
tell. Their essays bookend the volume, but they work best as a pair. Rather than ex-
amining particular historical phenomena, they take a more philosophical approach.
“[H]istory is all we have to go on,” argues Rodger, and therefore it must play a 
central role in shaping naval policy. At the same time, navies need to beware the 
pitfalls of historical myths. Memories are what make us human, and history is our 
collective memory; but, much like our memories, history is fallible, and much of 
what we think we know is wrong. The role of the historian is to correct the record. 
When given opportunities to speak to those whose primary concern is what will 
happen in the future, historians should proceed cautiously. History never repeats 
itself exactly, and “lessons” from history are, at best, general warnings. Historians 
are no better than naval officers at predicting the future, but they can encourage na-
val officers to think more carefully about the past so as to have a better foundation 
for thinking about the future. Rodger and Rahn both make the point that historians 
cannot neglect the complexity of their subject, as the fastest way to create a danger-
ous myth is to oversimplify the past.
Till echoes two of Rodger’s points. First, navies need to know their histories: 
“a navy that does not know its history has no soul.” Like Rodger and Rahn, Till 
worries that history too often is used as a means of socializing new entrants, telling 
myths that shape organizational identities but that are in fact oversimplifications 
or simply wrong. He also agrees with Rodger that history rhymes. Navies should 
study their history not because past events will recur exactly, but rather because 
practitioners need to be able to draw on a wide pool of “comparable but not iden-
tical situations.” Till also extends Rodger’s arguments in two ways. History is not 
simply the gathering of comparable situations; it is an intellectual process. Profes-
sional military education should force students to think from the cabinet meeting 
to the battlefield and back again, and from military hardware back to the factory 
and raw materials. Historians seek to explain past phenomena, and they necessarily 
must think flexibly and creatively about causal chains. Training leaders to think like 
historians makes it more likely that the right questions will be asked. The burden, 
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according to Till, should not fall entirely on practitioners, and his lecture ends with 
a call to standards for naval historians.
Recently the Naval War College established the John B. Hattendorf Center for 
Maritime Historical Research to address precisely these issues. It advocates for the 
teaching of history in professional military education, and it serves as a central 
resource for scholars of U.S. naval history and maritime history more broadly. Its 
faculty contribute to the curriculum and publish original documentary research. In 
the spirit of the Hattendorf Prize, the center seeks a global perspective on maritime 
affairs, and it connects navies and naval historians.
These four lectures represent the best work of a generation of naval historians, 
and they illustrate the ways in which that generation crafted its work. Every disci-
pline has its own founders, and those founders serve as reference points; they rare-
ly require introductions or explanations (Clausewitz, Marx, Weber, Keynes, etc.). 
They become integrated into the language of the discipline, serving as shorthand for 
complex ideas and extensive bodies of scholarship. The language of naval history, 
as exemplified in this volume, uses the scholars of the turn of the twentieth century, 
especially Mahan and Corbett, to sketch the outlines of arguments and highlight 
areas of disagreement. For Kennedy, the First World War was a “Mackinder-ite 
land struggle, with surface navies operating at the margins.” Victory for the Allies 
was, to a small degree, a product of keeping open the sea lines of communication 
(Corbett) and, to a much larger degree, a product of winning on land (Mackinder) 
and introducing American industrial might (Kennedy). Rahn disagrees, arguing 
that Germany’s large battle-fleet-in-being helped pin down British resources and 
partly justified the arch-Mahanian approach of Tirpitz. (Rahn concedes that the 
fleet cost too much to be worth the trouble.) Britain’s distant economic blockade 
and Corbettian control of the sea lines of communication was not marginal but 
central to Germany’s defeat.
So long as historians do not allow shorthand versions of Mahan and Corbett to 
confuse their readers or oversimplify their arguments, we should embrace them 
as reference points. The debates these theorists sparked are timeless, and they are 
helpful in integrating contemporary scholarship into an existing framework. Yet 
Rodger and Till both warn of the limitations of Mahan and Corbett. For Till, the 
problem is the fundamental flexibility of sea power. As navies are asked to do ever 
more, especially low-intensity enforcement of international law, Mahan and Cor-
bett do not seem to be able to offer much guidance. They should be read for per-
spectives on war fighting and deterrent war prevention at sea, but not as substitutes 
for a meaningful discussion of the wide range of obligations navies now must meet. 
Rodger calls attention to Mahan’s assumption that the world will continue as it 
has before. Like Thomas Malthus a century earlier, Mahan had the misfortune to 
publish on the cusp of epochal changes in his subject area. While this in no way 
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invalidates his work, it serves as a cautionary tale to historians eager to extract les-
sons from their research.
What Rodger and Till suggest, then, is that we need a more complex under-
standing of Mahan and Corbett. This is not a new idea. As John Hattendorf himself 
argued, “We need to return once again to these writers, considering their thought 
carefully in the light of continuing historical research and understanding.” He 
went on to praise the Naval Institute’s Classics of Sea Power series for providing 
modern commentary and annotations on the great works, and to encourage both 
practitioners and historians to consider their relevance.2 That was 1993; today, 
the Naval Institute is publishing its 21st Century Foundations series with similar 
goals.3 We must continue in this vein, but we also should understand the difference 
between a foundational reference point and scripture. Mahan, Corbett, and their 
peers are useful only insofar as we ask the right questions of them. In some cases, 
they may not be fit for the purpose, even if they seem destined to remain the stars 
by which naval history navigates.
Let this volume serve three purposes. First, it is an example of naval history 
done well. All the essays were written by distinguished scholars, and they dem-
onstrate the best of the field. They look beyond operations, integrating sea power 
into larger frameworks; they revel in complexity, rejecting simple explanations; and 
most of all, they ask the right questions. The lectures also demonstrate the endur-
ing relevance of sea power theory. Mahan is not enough, but—thanks in part to the 
prize laureates—no one is suggesting that he is. Understanding the parameters of 
the historical debates, as well as their limitations, is essential for all those interested 
in naval history.
Finally, the lectures connect naval historians to navies. It is remarkable how 
easy it is for the two groups to ignore each other. Navies are comfortable with their 
myths, and generally do not like to be told that most of what they think they know 
is wrong. Then, too, historians generally are uncomfortable when asked to apply 
their work. Better, some say, to keep the sacred flame of pure scholarly inquiry 
safe from the grubby hands of practitioners. Yet, as the prize lectures remind us, 
naval historians need to spend time with naval personnel so as to understand their 
culture and worldview. As the Hattendorf Prize and the Hattendorf Center at the 
Naval War College look toward the next decade of operations, these are valuable 
lessons to keep in mind.
EVAN WILSON 
Assistant Professor, John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research 
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
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 1 Rodger did not spare his own work, calling his earli-
est book “sketchy and unreliable.” N. A. M. Rodger, 
The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of 
Britain, 1649–1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 
821, 845.
 2  John B. Hattendorf, “Mahan Is Not Enough: Confer-
ence Themes and Issues,” in Mahan Is Not Enough: 
The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir 
Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 
ed. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf, Histori-
cal Monograph 10 (Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, 1993), p. 9.
 3 While new books on more-obscure thinkers are 
being added regularly, it is unsurprising to note that 
21st Century Mahan and 21st Century Corbett were 
among the first to be published.
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The Naval War College is pleased to recognize you as the first Hattendorf Prize Laureate. This 
award is predicated on your distinguished achievements as an assiduous historical researcher 
as well as the author of beautifully written and intellectually impressive studies of Britain’s naval 
history. Your scope, embracing more than a thousand years of naval history, is informed and 
given depth by an equally broad understanding of your subject. Your impressive command of 
sources, ranging from medieval documents in Latin to modern archives and scholarly works in 
a broad range of European languages, has established a new and more comprehensive approach 
to writing a national naval history. You have written that “the naval historian has to be aware 
of what other historians are writing to do justice to his own subject, and explain its importance 
to others. To do so he has to integrate a wide range of knowledge. It goes without saying that 
this demands a great deal of reading and not inconsiderable literary skills, so it is not surprising 
that successful naval histories which take this approach are rare.” Your works exemplify that 
description and have themselves become prizes for us to read. This award honors you and your 
work, expressing appreciation for your distinguished academic research, insight, and writing 
that contribute to a deeper historical understanding of the broad context and interrelationships 
involved in the roles, achievements, and uses of navies within the contexts of both maritime 
and general history.
The Hattendorf Prize for  
Distinguished Original Research  
in Maritime History
to N. A. M. Rodger, M.A., D.Phil., F.B.A., F.R.Hist.S., F.S.A., 
Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
The President, U.S. Naval War College, takes great pleasure 
in awarding
Presented this 20th day of October 2011 at the 
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
John N. Christenson 
Rear Admiral, United States Navy 
President, Naval War College
According to Hegel, we learn from history that we do not learn from his-tory.1 We also learn that historians are deeply unreliable, and never more so than when they are foolish enough to predict the future. Historians, in 
fact, would certainly be the worst possible guides to the policy maker, were it not 
for the alternative. But the alternative is not other people with better information 
but other people with no information, for it is the past that makes the present and 
the future. All of us, as individuals, as organizations, and as societies, have person-
alities that are made up of our experiences. It is memory that makes us what we are, 
and to lose memory is to lose personality. In this age of dementia, many of us are 
painfully familiar with what happens when people lose their memories, but though 
individuals can lose their minds, societies and organizations (like navies) never 
escape their past. All we know comes from our experience, and all our experience 
is of the past. The future, which it would be very convenient to know, is regrettably 
inaccessible; the present constantly slips between our fingers. Only the past makes 
us who we are, and it shapes our understanding of the world. The question is not 
whether we should or whether we can learn from the past; we have no choice, if we 
are to learn at all. Recent or distant, history is all we have to go on, and we cannot 
escape it.
To read the writings or listen to the speeches of public figures is to encounter 
a dense tissue of historical references and allusions. Sometimes they are conscious 
references to historical events that form, or are believed to form, part of the com-
mon stock of social memory. Occasionally they are the fruit of serious knowledge 
of the past, but more often they refer to some of the common myths that bind na-
tions and societies together. Usually these myths have historical roots, but in the 
process of shaping national identity they tend to lose any close relation with the 
truth of what really happened. Where do they come from, these urban myths and 
long-exploded fallacies that form so much of the discourse of public life? Half-
remembered primary-school lessons, anecdotes overheard in the pub, newspapers 
read over someone’s shoulder seem to have more power to form opinion than any 
scholar could dream of. “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
The Perils of History
N. A. M. RODGER
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from any intellectual influence,” wrote J. M. Keynes, “are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling 
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”2 Our problem is 
not that we know too little history to understand the present but that we know too 
much, and most of it is wrong.
Even when it is right, moreover, the history that is put to use is often the wrong 
history. In September 2011 a short article appeared in the Economist that reviewed 
the situation of the euro, quoting an unnamed ambassador:3
 
“I feel like a filing clerk 
in Berlin in 1945. The work of government goes on, even as the war approaches.” 
Inspired by this remark, the anonymous author indulged in an extended range of 
military metaphors and allusions to events of the Second World War. Clearly he 
wanted to show off his knowledge of that war, but it was not obvious that it told the 
reader anything at all about the financial crisis. There is of course a very relevant 
history that could and should have been deployed—the history of currency unions. 
The history of the Zollverein (which led to the unified currency of the 1871 Ger-
man Reich); of the Latin, Scandinavian, and East African currency unions (which 
all failed); of the West African franc and the Belgium-Luxembourg currency link 
(still flourishing)—all offer relevant lessons. The eighteenth-century New England 
monetary union shows that common currencies can circulate without political 
union, while the history of the United States over its first century shows that a 
political union does not require a common currency (at least initially). All these 
would have been highly instructive historical excursions; the Second World War 
was mere self-indulgence, and even if the journalist had been a real expert in it, it 
would still have been irrelevant. 
What is more, real expertise is no guarantee that history will guide us in the 
right direction. There could be no better nor more apposite example of the expert 
historian than Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, and yet in reading his great works we can 
easily see that he was wrong to assume that certain features of the world he had 
grown up with would last forever. For him the sea was always commanded by a 
single, dominant European naval power, and Britain was the only plausible candi-
date. He looked forward to the day when the U.S. Navy would be capable of joining 
an alliance with Britain, but he clearly did not expect that there would ever be more 
than a handful of serious naval powers. Though he lived in the first great age of free 
trade and liberal economics, he did not foresee that the result would be the creation 
of many advanced economies and modern navies all over the world. Nor did he 
realize that the growth of the U.S. Navy, to which he dedicated his career, would 
inevitably make it impossible for Britain or any other European power to dominate 
the seas of the world single-handed. Consequently he has relatively little to say to 
our age of naval coalitions.
 THE PERILS OF HISTORY 13 12 THE HATTENDORF PRIZE LECTURES, VOLUME 1
Most common and most destructive of all, however, are not appeals to the les-
sons of real history, nor even conscious references to shared myth, but unconscious 
assumptions that reveal themselves in turns of phrase and habits of thought. This is 
history at the deepest and most universal level, the history that lies below the foun-
dations of every intellectual construction and undermines so many of them. This 
is the history that everybody shares and nobody needs to think about; these are the 
assumptions that are never challenged. This history is everywhere, but much of it 
is bad history, and the longer it goes unchallenged, the more dangerous it becomes. 
This history provides people with ready-made solutions to new problems, and it 
“proves” that they are the right solutions. 
Whatever the locus of action, from national government down to precinct, whether in an 
executive body or a legislative committee, some participants are almost sure to start with 
favorite, long-developed schemes. Their inclination will be to ignore whatever seems not to 
fit and to define the problem as one calling for solutions they have handy. Their arguments 
will be supported, more than likely, by analogies.4
The analogies will be drawn from experience, that is, from history, and most likely 
from the history that has the most emotional power.
Traumatic events dig deep foundations in the national psyche. In Britain the 
appeasement of Hitler has long been such an event. Sir Anthony Eden’s response 
to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was clearly shaped by his 
determination never again to appease a dictator. But events suggest that the prec-
edent of Hitler was not very helpful in dealing with Colonel Nasser, and one cannot 
help thinking that if Eden had confronted and analyzed it he would have realized 
as much. In other crises since, the reflex never to appease a dictator has evident-
ly served British governments rather better. For the United States the equivalent 
trauma is Pearl Harbor. It was the image that leaped to many minds on that “day 
of infamy,” September 11, 2001, when the terrorists attacked the Twin Towers, and 
it evidently shaped President Bush’s response, which was to declare war on some-
body at once and invade somewhere as quickly as possible. Even at the time, many 
observers doubted if it was wise to raise a criminal gang to the status of a sovereign 
state or whether invasion of one or two countries, however unpleasant they were, 
was really the best response to an international terrorist movement.5 
Today, Pearl Harbor visibly lurks just below the surface of much discussion of 
U.S. relations with China. Clearly there are excellent reasons for the United States 
(and the world) to pay close attention to China, but to me it seems that the case 
differs in most respects from that of Japan in the 1930s and that the mere fact that 
China constitutes a potential threat to U.S. interests from approximately the same 
part of the world is a bad reason for drawing conscious—or, more dangerously, 
unconscious—parallels with 1941. It is especially dangerous because of one notable 
difference: in 1941 the Pacific naval powers were (as a consequence of the Washing-
ton naval treaties) so far apart that they were largely out of each other’s range, but 
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today the United States and China have many opportunities to clash in and around 
the China seas. A sudden emergency generated by some unexpected incident is the 
worst possible moment to be guided by unconscious historical parallels. Moreover, 
the Chinese too have their traumatic moments in history that are likely to shape 
their responses in any confrontation with an external power. In their case, it is the 
myth-history of the Opium War that is endlessly invoked to explain how to resist 
foreign aggression.6 This history would be well worth study by American policy 
makers.
Since history is impossible to escape and bad history is difficult to avoid, the 
historian has at least the essential function of distinguishing the two, of warning 
against bad history and false analogy. Historians may have no special qualifications 
to predict the future, but at least they can check the misuse of the past. For strate-
gists and policy makers, however, this may not be enough. I know from experience 
that people can be very annoyed with historians who insist how much better quali-
fied they are than anyone else to avoid the dangers of predicting the future by false 
analogy with the past but then refuse to risk their reputations by making any pre-
dictions at all. The historian must always be intensely conscious that history never 
repeats itself exactly; historical parallels are never really parallel, and the “lessons of 
history” are at best general warnings, not specific instructions. It has been well said 
that “history never repeats itself, but sometimes it rhymes.”7 Historians cannot help 
noticing resemblances between the present day and the periods they study, and 
these may at least suggest pitfalls to avoid and possibilities to exploit. 
I myself have recently been studying the nineteenth century, and I believe there 
are suggestive similarities between that era and our own in two dimensions: diplo-
macy and strategy, and economics and trade. In diplomacy and strategy we may 
concentrate on the leading European nations, for in the nineteenth century the 
great powers were still essentially European. The United States, as the century wore 
on, increasingly acquired the economic potential to act as a great power, but in 
practice it remained largely absorbed in its own internal development; it did not 
choose to involve itself deeply in world affairs, and (except during the Civil War) 
its armed forces were negligible. For almost forty years after the Congress of Vienna 
ended the Napoleonic War, the peace of Europe was largely assured by the “Concert 
of Europe”—meaning the loose, informal grouping of the victors in that war—to 
preserve stability and restrain French expansionism. This was then disrupted by 
the Russian war of 1852–55 (rather misleadingly called the Crimean War, since its 
origins lay in the Levant and its most decisive campaign was fought in the Baltic), 
followed by the German and Italian wars of unification. 
In 1871 the creation of the German Second Reich marked the emergence of a 
new, powerful, and expansionist military power in Central Europe. For the last 
thirty years of the century and the early years of the next, Europe (and by extension 
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the world as well) was increasingly destabilized by the rise of two hungry and am-
bitious powers, Germany and Russia, and by the decline and vulnerability of two 
extensive empires, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Comfortable, pos-
sessor powers like Britain and France had imperial ambitions and rivalries across 
the world but hoped to keep the peace within Europe by restraining aggressors and 
supporting existing frontiers. The British in particular feared that a collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire would allow Russia to expand to the Mediterranean and threaten 
the vital imperial sea route to India. Toward the end of the century the British be-
came increasingly worried that Russian expansion in Central Asia would place the 
Russian army within direct striking distance of India—though the modern eye and 
modern maps suggest that the very long distances and very high mountains that 
separated them would have put an invasion far out of practical reach.
Retrospect suggests that Britain’s preeminence was under growing threat from 
the 1870s at latest. British statesmen, however, like the vast majority of world lead-
ers in every age, had learned their view of the world as young men and did not sub-
stantially change it as they grew older. The leaders of that generation had formed 
their outlook in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, when it seemed that Britain had noth-
ing to fear from Continental rivals and nothing to lose from what Lord Palmerston 
(twice prime minister) called “splendid isolation.” For them British preeminence 
was a given, a product of history and economic dominance that no one could doubt 
or challenge. There was no need to spend much money on the navy, still less the 
army, because only savages would be ignorant and foolish enough to challenge 
them. The only superpower dominated the world by political and economic rather 
than military strength. It has been well said that “superpowers in any age function 
much on strategic credit. Their writ, that is, runs much more on the basis of their 
reputation for effective coercion than on the actual exercise of power.”8 Reputation 
was cheap and effective, there had been no credible military threat to Britain for 
half a century, and British political leaders of the generation of Disraeli and Glad-
stone found it difficult to take seriously the idea that there might be another in the 
foreseeable future.
This confidence rested on Britain’s economic superiority. By 1815 Britain was 
the world’s leading trading nation, with an unsurpassed financial strength that had 
allowed it to finance the entire allied war effort in the closing stages of the Napole-
onic War. In the succeeding years of peace the Industrial Revolution gathered pace, 
and in the 1840s the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts threw open 
British shipping and overseas trade to international competition and ushered in the 
era of free trade. This was the first age of globalization, when the free movement of 
capital and technology and the progressive removal of barriers to trade led to a very 
rapid increase in international prosperity. It also led to the rise of new industrial 
powers abroad. From being in the 1840s the only advanced industrial economy in 
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the world, Britain was by the end of the century only one of several, some of them 
having much greater populations, land areas, and stores of natural resources than 
its own. 
It was obvious to contemporaries that British economic preeminence was un-
der threat, and it seemed to many that ambitious rivals might easily translate that 
threat into military terms—or rather, naval terms, for all credible strategic threats 
to Britain were necessarily naval ones. By the 1880s the old-fashioned and quite un-
realistic fears of an unexpected surprise attack across the Channel had been largely 
abandoned. In their place came a newer and more credible threat to Britain’s world-
wide trade, to an economy now heavily dependent on imported food and raw ma-
terials and exported manufactures. Moreover, this threat no longer came entirely 
from rival European powers. Advanced economies were rising in other parts of the 
world, some of them showing signs of spending their wealth and industrial capac-
ity on modern navies. For two centuries the British had been able to dominate the 
seas of the world indirectly by keeping their main fleet at home, for defense against 
their neighbors, who were their only serious enemies. By the late 1890s two small 
but modern navies, those of the United States and Japan, were rising in distant seas 
that could not be dominated from Europe.
British strategists recognized their country’s radical and unique dependence on 
seaborne trade but were divided in their response. Some feared attack and planned 
various strategies of defense. Others placed more or most of their trust in the de-
velopment of international law. The rise of the global economy was paralleled in the 
second half of the nineteenth century by the rise of a new kind of international law, 
founded on international treaties signed by most, if not all, of the leading powers. 
The first of these was the Declaration of Paris of 1857, which professed to outlaw 
privateering (though the United States refused to sign and still claims the right to 
issue letters of marque). More important were the Hague and London Conferences 
of 1908–1909, which set out to write international rules to protect wartime trade, 
define contraband, and forbid blockade. The Declaration of London proposed to 
establish an International Prize Court that would have been the first international 
court with jurisdiction over sovereign states (though only if both parties chose to 
appeal to it). 
The proposed Prize Court never came to fruition, and the force of these inter-
national agreements, like all their predecessors, rested on “customary international 
law,” which essentially meant the capacity of neutrals to restrain belligerent navies. 
Behind this expectation that neutral powers would have real influence over bellig-
erents lay a clear understanding of the complexity and vulnerability of the web of 
international trade, on which all advanced economies were heavily, and mutually, 
dependent. Any form of economic warfare at sea, it was presumed, would ruin all 
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the participants and render war impossible to sustain. In the era of globalization, 
therefore, modern war would have to be short if it were to be possible at all, and 
the capacity to keep it going would depend largely or entirely on neutrals’ freedom 
to trade. The First World War was to falsify almost all of these expectations, in the 
process ruining the leading belligerents and wrecking the world trading system. 
In place of free trade it brought an age of protectionism, financial crisis, economic 
collapse, and another world war.
What, if any, resemblances may we find between this world and our own? First, 
we must obviously increase the scale from Europe to the whole world. That done, 
we may see some suggestive parallels between the postwar settlements of 1815 and 
of 1945. The Cold War was scarcely a “Concert of Europe,” but in both cases the 
wartime allies continued to dominate the postwar world and prevent their rivalries 
from leading to war, except among client states on the strategic periphery. Once 
again a new age of free trade and surging economic growth lifted nations in some 
parts of the world from poverty into the status of advanced economies in two gen-
erations. Once again this huge advance in world prosperity depended entirely on 
ships trading across free and open seas. Once again it is very widely assumed that 
the complexity and interdependence of the modern world trading system makes it 
unthinkable that any advanced state would contemplate disrupting it by war. Today, 
however, the new age of free trade seems to be threatened by financial collapse and 
political instability in ways reminiscent of the 1890s. Ambitious rising powers once 
more press against the weaknesses of existing empires. 
A comparison of Japan then and China now suggests itself—but I have already 
suggested that I think this is simplistic and dangerous. I think there may be more 
to be learned by comparing modern China9 with Bismarckian Germany. Both are 
populous states in central positions with historic pretensions to imperial status, 
and with rapidly growing economic and military strength to back them. In both 
cases dazzling economic growth tends to conceal the extent to which the econo-
mies remain backward and dependent on foreign technology and finance. In both 
cases political unity and constitutional structures remain fragile, and foreign policy 
is marked by aggressive insecurity. Growing prosperity and power will no doubt 
continue to reconcile many tensions, but the Chinese regime would be vulnerable 
to any serious economic or political check. This is an uncomfortable reflection, for 
this is the classic situation in which unstable dictatorships attempt to rebuild crum-
bling support at home by reckless adventures abroad. The world has a heavy invest-
ment in China’s economic growth and political unity. A China growing smoothly 
to become a prosperous and advanced economy with a large stake in world security 
and peace and a huge market open to trade would be very much in the interest of 
all. A nuclear-armed China sliding backward into poverty and instability presents 
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incalculable risks. A large sector of public opinion in the United States regards Chi-
na’s strength as a threat, but it is China’s weakness that ought to worry us.
So ought the fragility of the world economic system. Piracy and protectionism, 
to name only the two most obvious dangers, are capable of inflicting grave damage 
on world prosperity. The Somalis have shown how easy and profitable is piracy for 
ransom, in the tradition of the North African regencies, and there is plenty of scope 
for others to imitate them. Protectionism in the wake of a world financial crisis did 
much to bring on the Second World War, and there are populist politicians, in the 
United States and elsewhere, willing to try again. A regional war, in, say, the Middle 
East, could have destructive effects on essential international trades, notably in oil. 
In these and other aspects the machinery of international free trade is delicate and 
easily deranged. Precedent suggests that international law, naval power, and the en-
lightened self-interest of trading nations are relatively feeble defenses. I do not want 
to predict that another major war is coming soon, but it is certainly not impossible, 
and if there is any truth in my comparison with the late nineteenth century, the 
analogy is not encouraging. Navies have unequaled flexibility as instruments of 
deterrence and diplomacy, and in the present state of the world it seems to me that 
their most urgent task is to win the peace.
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While many great and extended conflicts involving the use of the sea have been fought over the past two thousand years, the three most notable in modern times were undoubtedly those struggles for global 
mastery in the years 1793–1815, 1914–18, and 1939–45. Each of these conflicts 
has produced a plethora of detailed works upon aspects of the war in question, but 
the profession has avoided making a comparative study of them to draw broader 
conclusions about the influence of sea power in the modern world.1
This chapter makes an attempt to do that, and with a particular interest in ex-
amining why the exercise of naval force during the second of the three conflicts 
is generally regarded as having had much less effectiveness than in the other two. 
Examining why naval power in 1914–18 had much less “influence” than its prewar 
advocates hoped might then help us to a better understanding of the limitations of 
naval force as well as of its positive capabilities. Above all, the essay is interested in 
the changing contexts in which sea power had to operate over these one hundred 
and fifty years of what one scholar nicely termed “the influence of history upon sea 
power.”2
This is a lengthy argument, and so the structure of the essay below has been 
divided, rather obviously, into wartime and peacetime sections. Since the great 
naval struggle for mastery between 1793 and 1815 is generally regarded as the 
apotheosis of sea power in action, no detailed account is offered below of the many 
great battles that took place within those years, or of where British diplomacy 
and naval influence successfully marched hand in hand, as in the Baltic, or of the 
campaigns in the Eastern Seas.3 What seemed more important was to produce 
a reasonably brief structural analysis of why it was that sea power played such a 
prominent role in a struggle for the mastery of Europe that in the final analysis 
obviously had to be settled by military victory over Napoleon on land. Not all 
European great wars saw naval power play a significant part; indeed, the great-
est in recent memory—the Thirty Years’ War between 1618 and 1648—had little 
to do with the sea, or the sea with it. Why it was different in the titanic French 
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Revolutionary and Napolonic Wars therefore obviously requires explanation before 
the rest of this essay can unfold.
From time to time this text engages with the arguments and presumptions of 
Captain Mahan regarding how sea power exactly did influence the wars in ques-
tion. This is not done in any intellectually hostile way; it simply seeks to offer a re-
ality check upon whether it was sea power itself that caused the outcomes claimed, 
and if completely or to a lesser degree. It also attempts to test the story of these 
wars against the strategic theories of the two greatest of Mahan’s “foils”: Sir Julian 
Corbett, with his claim that it was command of control of the ocean routes (not 
the decisive battle) that counted; and Sir Halford Mackinder, with his claim that it 
was land power, or who gained control of the great West European landmass, that 
would count most in the outcome of modern wars.4
To undertake a comparative analysis of the influence of sea power upon cer-
tain earlier wars—say, between the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years’ 
War, and the American Revolutionary War—is not so difficult, simply because 
so very much about navies and warships stayed the same, and because the battles 
largely took place within the very similar constraints of time and tide, during the 
high point of the age of fighting sail. This was no longer the case after the early 
nineteenth century, because of two enormous, and separate, changes in histori-
cal conditions. While the 1793–1815 campaigns took place in the pre–Industrial 
Revolution era, the circumstances under which the admirals of 1914 had to fight 
were dramatically different. Further and very large changes in the condition and 
circumstance of navies were also to occur in the much briefer period between the 
second and third of the great global wars analyzed here. The British Navy of, say, 
1940 may have seemed very similar to that of a quarter-century earlier, yet so much 
had changed, especially in regard to the rise of air power, both carrier-based and 
land-based. Further, the global naval balances, especially in the Far East, were now 
quite altered from those of 1914. Captain Mahan, in summarizing the “elements of 
sea power” in his first, great work, felt that they belonged to the “unchanging order 
of things, remaining the same, in cause and effect, from age to age.”5 It is the inten-
tion of this essay to test if that was really so, given the stupendous impact of the 
Industrial Revolution upon warfare, and the special influence of air power upon 
fighting in the years after 1919.
It follows that a very large part of this chapter has had to focus on the two pe-
riods between the wars. While not originally foreseen by the author, it became in-
creasingly clear that no analysis of the influence of sea power upon history could 
be made unless maritime affairs were tested against change over time, between the 
great conflicts, especially change driven by the onset of newer technologies. It is not 
unreasonable to claim that Nelson himself would have been very familiar on board 
Blake’s flagship of 150 years earlier; but Jellicoe and Nimitz would have been quite 
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lost on a century-older warship. “Sea power in an age of change” is thus the core 
theme, and implicit title, of the present investigation.
1793–1815
Since this war ended with Napoleon’s surrender after being defeated by a great 
land-coalition force at Waterloo in 1815, it seemed incumbent upon Mahan to 
make his well-known claim that “those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which 
the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.”6 
Writing then as a professor at the Naval War College, and as the advocate of a much 
larger American Navy, his position was an understandable one. He had to convince 
readers, including perhaps congressional skeptics, that sea power counted in world 
affairs, and the British struggle against Napoleon offered him much evidence for 
that claim. Later scholars have not contested this. After all, the 1793–1815 con-
flict in Western Europe was mainly a struggle between three naval nations, Britain, 
France, and Spain, such that if any one side gained at sea the other was very ad-
versely weakened; each intruded upon the other, and therefore navies very much 
counted.7
The geography of these wars at sea was thus of overwhelming significance; it 
intruded at every stage, and to a degree unimaginable in the modern jet age. Noth-
ing here was new, for geography had played the same critical role in the five pre- 
vious Anglo-Spanish-French conflicts between 1689 and 1783. Britain benefited, of 
course, from its insularity and freedom from invasion by land; and after 1603 and 
1707, by its union with Scotland. In the age of sail, it benefited from the prevailing 
currents and winds that so often pinned the French fleets into their harbors, and 
from an array of good naval bases from Devon to the Thames. It benefited to an 
incalculable degree by the possession of Gibraltar (as it would again in 1940–43), 
and also from its possession of Halifax, Kingston, and, very soon, Malta and the 
Cape. But in a struggle against France and Spain geography did not favor Britain to 
the extent it did in its wars against the Dutch, the Danes, or Wilhelmine Germany. 
Franco-Spanish raiders and larger squadrons could get out to the Atlantic and be-
yond, and did so repeatedly; and they also, of course, possessed good harbors in 
the Mediterranean itself. All these waters were contested space, therefore, which is 
why the naval battles themselves (the Glorious First of June, Cape Saint Vincent, 
Trafalgar, and, farther north, Camperdown and Copenhagen) were invested with 
such importance and fought so keenly by each side. Little wonder that Mahan was 
so impressed at the idea of a main battle force that would sweep all before it, and 
thus ensure command of the oceans.
Since these were wars of endurance—twenty-three years of struggle—victory 
would go to the power with the deepest purse and the greatest economic capacity. 
Ostensibly, this would have been France, with more than twice the population of 
Britain and a rich agricultural and commercial base, and a commensurate taxation 
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capacity; but after Colbert’s earlier efforts, this potential was never realized, and 
from the 1720s the advantage swung to a Walpolian Britain, which gave the coun-
try an adamantine political strength and an astounding creditworthiness. The hard 
figures told the story; halfway through every great conflict, the U.K. Treasury could 
continue to float loans (at much lower interest rates) when its rivals could not. As 
Osterhammel explains, between 1688 and 1815 U.K. gross national product rose 
threefold and taxation revenue fifteenfold; Britain could raise more than twice as 
much in taxes as France.8 By the later stages of the war against Napoleon, the island-
nation had become a gigantic export-producing machine. If France had been able 
to shut it down, through the Continental System and other embargoes, London’s 
war strategy would have shuddered to a halt. That never happened; Britain fal-
tered (in 1797, when the Bank of England suspended specie payments), but its 
insularity, ever-growing economy, political resilience, access to newer global mar-
kets, and strong naval edge kept it going. And it still had money to subsidize major 
and minor European allies to take up the fight against Napoleon, by funding their 
armies and providing their weapons. Again and again, French victories in the field 
blew apart these coalitions; and every time they were reassembled and refunded, 
France’s manpower bled a little more and its capacity to interrupt Britain’s space 
grew less. Finally, Napoleon’s twin bouts of imperial overstretch, into Spain and 
into Russia in 1812–14, gave London the chance to play all its cards—naval pres-
sure, massive subsidies, a Wellingtonian army—to assist in toppling France’s gigan-
tic bid for mastery.
The later historian is tempted to say: given the many above factors in Britain’s 
favor, all that was needed was for it to maintain a strong and unchallengeable navy, 
under steady and intelligent leadership. Such leadership for pursuing the war was 
there, even with a stricken king and when cabinet coalitions were shaky. From the 
very onset of the French Revolution, governments in London committed enough 
funds to build a huge fleet of line-of-battle ships and cruisers, with supporting 
dockyards, munitions, and manpower. While the system groaned frequently under 
the immense strains of combating the joint Franco-Spanish fleets and their massive 
resources, it never snapped. The final advantages—of Nelson’s unique charismatic 
leadership in battle and the remarkably high quality of so many other admirals and 
captains (Collingwood, Saumarez, Hood, Cochrane—where does the list stop?)—
can be added in here, but how exactly one weighs each of the above elements of 
strength that made up Britain’s war machine is impossible.
What is clear is that one has here a rare historical example of national and naval 
strength that was partly foreshadowed (in 1714 and 1763) but now came to full 
fruition. The conflict had been so lengthy, and drained so many resources, that it 
left all the other participants exhausted, winded, and in need of years of recovery. 
Little wonder that the Prussian general Gneisenau afterward inveighed against that 
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“blackguard” Napoleon whose ambitions had plunged the Continent into war, leav-
ing Britain free to exploit the fruits of the world.9 In all this effort, the role of the 
Royal Navy had counted so much—wherever I go, Napoleon complained, I find it 
in the way—but it was as one strand, one part of the whole. Mahan was therefore 
entirely justified in enthusing about the influence of sea power upon history here, 
but it was an influence that had worked because all the other strands were in place 
as well.
1815–1914
No period in the maritime history of the previous two thousand years came close to 
the special strategic and political circumstances of the century after the surrender 
of Napoleon. When Rome dominated at sea, it was merely over Mediterranean wa-
ters; Adm. Cheng Ho’s great expeditionary fleets came and went across the Indian 
Ocean, without lasting impact; and Philip II’s navies were repeatedly challenged 
in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean. But here, for the first time, 
was a global maritime empire. To some degree, the post-1815 Pax Britannica can 
be explained on negative grounds: it happened, and was allowed to happen, be-
cause the other major powers did not contest British naval predominance outside 
Europe during these many decades. Certain European countries (Prussia, Portugal, 
Greece, the Italian states) usually found the Royal Navy’s protection abroad a dis-
tinct benefit to their shipping and seamen in those midcentury decades of growing 
free trade. The French and Russian navies posed sporadic threats, but on certain 
other occasions were to be found cooperating with British naval forces, as in their 
joint crushing of Mehemet Ali’s fleet at Navarino in 1827; or, at least in regard to the 
French Navy, in shared large-scale operations in the Black Sea against Russia dur-
ing the Crimean War. For a while after 1815 the fast, very heavy American frigates 
gave the British Admiralty cause for concern, but American attention to sea power, 
and to building a substantial national naval force, was never very sustained during 
the nineteenth century.10
But the Pax Britannica also existed because a long line of British governments 
and parliaments was determined to pay for command of the sea. There was no lack 
of pressure by members of Parliament to keep naval budgets low, yet spending on 
the fleets never fell to hopeless levels, and ironically it was the Liberal side of the 
House that most insisted upon maintaining a decent navy—the more so to keep 
Britain from being so weak internationally as to rely upon continental alliances. 
But of course that political prejudice against entanglements rested conveniently 
upon an economy which by the 1850s, in Hobsbawm’s calculation, produced two-
thirds of the world’s coal, half of its iron, and five-sevenths of its steel.11 Maritime 
preeminence, imperial advantage, technological strength, and isolationist prefer-
ence all nicely reinforced each other at this time, and no foreign competitor came 
close, or seriously attempted to be a competitor. 
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Moreover, the naval predominance that was the Pax Britannica was not sig-
nificantly affected, at least for quite a long while to come, by the advent of steam 
power and the Industrial Revolution. That may seem remarkable given that fossil 
fuels could be found in many parts of the world, so competitors had at least the 
raw potential for imitation and catch-up. But in the first instance what the Indus-
trial Revolution did was to enhance vastly the already great economic and pro-
ductive power of Britain itself, both vis-à-vis its traditional rivals (some of whom, 
like France, were not so blessed in resources of coal and iron) and vis-à-vis non- 
European societies in Africa and India that had not even the elemental capaci-
ties for Western-type modernization. As British manufactured goods streamed out 
across the globe in the 1840s and 1850s, the world seemed to be ever more the “oys-
ter” for the victors of Trafalgar and Waterloo. Thus, the rising exports of steam lo-
comotives and railway equipment to the Rhineland and Pennsylvania seemed only 
to tie such markets to British manufacturing centers and bring large profits, and 
not to be enabling future world rivals. And it would be some time before the exten-
sions of foreign railway networks began to create new centers of geopolitical power 
in the American Midwest and across the Ukraine, far from the workings of any 
future blockade. And since it was in south Wales that there occurred the very best 
steaming coals for all types of ships, it seemed that industrialization merely gave 
one further advantage in world power indices to a nation already almost unfairly 
endowed by geographic and other advantages. The longer-term consequences of 
the Industrial Revolution upon sea power were only to be appreciated, and then 
just partly, in the final quarter of the century, when other powers began to close 
the gap.12
One can gain a better understanding of all this if the “long nineteenth century” 
in its naval dimensions is divided into three chronological subcategories: that be-
tween 1815 and circa 1885, described above; between 1885 and 1906; and between 
1906 and the First World War. This at least was how it was in regard to the Royal 
Navy’s all-important global fleet distributions, as they were amended in each of 
these times. Geography of course could not change, but the relationship of the 
leading naval powers to each other did change as admiralties adjusted their naval 
programs, vessel types, and fleet dispositions, and the world’s leading naval power 
then sought to respond. These three chronological cutoff points also reflected some 
big changes in warship design, the increasingly stepped-up size of naval budgets, 
as well as the arrangements of the active fleets. There were some exceptions to this 
general three-part schema, but on the whole this breakdown can help readers of the 
period understand and locate such well-known events as the coming of the Two-
Power Standard, the Dreadnought “leap,” and Tirpitz’s naval laws.
Mention of these later and very rapid eruptions in naval matters again allows 
the reader to see better why the maritime and geopolitical contours of the 1815–85 
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years appear so relatively placid by comparison. Though there were significant 
changes in naval architecture, there was little standardization as warships sprouted 
a rich variety of profiles, funnels, masts (including sails), and gun calibers with little 
or no standardization of type compared with, say, the post-1919 era. The greatest 
war of the midcentury, the U.S. Civil War, had been overwhelmingly a land-based 
struggle, with sea power operating along its fringes. Bismarck’s three successful 
wars of unification in the 1860s were achieved without sea power being evoked at 
all. The Anglo-French naval operations against Russia during the Crimean War 
showed the difficulties of applying maritime pressure against such a landlocked, 
agrarian nation. For long decades after 1815 not much of naval significance hap-
pened in the waters outside Europe apart from antislavery patrols and the Opium 
Wars; later admirals’ memoirs could happily recall their frequent times as young 
lieutenants visiting Valparaiso and Brisbane. The many doings described in Oster-
hammel’s recent Transformation of the World rested, lightly and easily, upon an al-
most invisible and softly applied British naval preeminence.13 An integrated world 
of commerce and mainly peace was underpinned by the iron frames of the Royal 
Navy.
The significance of sea power within the Great Power system increased sig-
nificantly after the mid-1880s, when both the French and Russian governments, 
already colonial rivals to Britain in the Mediterranean, Africa, the Far East, and 
Southeast Asia, embarked upon sustained and very expensive programs of capital-
ship building. This so shook the British press and Parliament out of their compla-
cency that successive London governments could never again be free of the charge 
that they were underspending upon the Royal Navy, even when the Two-Power 
Act (i.e., the Naval Defence Act of 1889) and various expensive successor bills were 
announced.14 Naval spending ballooned, but so too did public agitations about a 
foreign invasion of England, the loss of control of the Mediterranean, and the end 
of the Pax Britannica.
If the British Admiralty and its planners were shaken by the sudden rise of the 
French and Russian new navies, they had every reason to be so. Geographically, 
those fleets would be very hard to handle. The fear was that fast and heavily gunned 
French armored cruisers, speedier than any Royal Navy battleship and more pow-
erful than any British cruiser, could operate out of such well-situated harbors as 
Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon, Algiers, Dakar, Madagascar, Reunion (Indian Ocean), 
Saigon, even French West Indian ports. Russian raiders could operate out of Vladi-
vostok, and later Port Arthur. A combined Russian Black Sea fleet and a French-
based Mediterranean force might possibly threaten Constantinople and the East-
ern Mediterranean. In that case, the critical British Empire trade routes through 
the Mediterranean would have to be suspended (as they were, of course, between 
1940 and 1943).
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All this offered a geostrategic nightmare, and one that seemed to have no obvi-
ous solution. Build and build as the Royal Navy did, could it really place strong 
blockading squadrons off all the above ports all the time, if French and Russian 
squadrons were to be based there? It would be an operational and logistical night-
mare. How also could an offshore blockade work without grave danger if the 
French chose to construct dozens of fast-attacking torpedo vessels (as they did), 
experiment with minefields and longer-range torpedoes, and design submarines 
of an ever-longer range? The close blockade was over, and the medium-distance 
offshore blockade was already at severe risk.15
This was the critical naval dimension to the “crisis of Empire” situation that 
faced British planners around the year 1900. Military disasters in South Africa 
led to huge increases in British military spending, at once far larger than anything 
spent upon the fleet. Russian military advances seemed to threaten across Asia. The 
great powers were snapping up Chinese ports—and thus newer naval bases. A war 
with France over the Nile Valley had just narrowly been avoided in 1898. Great new 
navies were being laid down by the United States and Japan, rising extra-European 
nations that would be impossible to blockade in any future war. The Pax Britan-
nica was at an end, even before a great modern German battle fleet began to be laid 
down in the North Sea. Had the German Navy remained modest and second-class 
in size, and Germany stayed friendly throughout the Edwardian years, the British 
global and imperial crisis would have remained. But the German Navy did not re-
main modest in size, nor did Germany stay friendly.
Viewed from this larger gloomy perspective, it is now easier to understand that 
immense flurry of defense measures and newer naval policies that the British en-
gaged in between about 1895 and 1906—measures that have drawn the attention 
of a whole host of recent naval historians of these years.16 The two-power standard 
was asserted again, and again. Battleships became larger and larger, to accommo-
date ever-bigger gun calibers, and at the same time became more and more heavily 
armored, and faster and faster—and much more expensive in consequence. Giant, 
fast, armored cruisers, even more pricey than battleships, were laid down. Flotil-
las of torpedo-boat destroyers were constructed, to protect those battleships from 
attack. Advances were made in various new forms of fire control, each with their 
impassioned claimants. Plans were also advanced for super-fast, heavily gunned 
though lightly protected types of battle cruisers that could scout in advance of the 
main battle fleet or range along imperial trade routes. Fresh undersea cables were 
laid along those same imperial maritime routes. Harbor defenses from Dover to 
Gibraltar, and from Toulon to Dakar, were expensively renewed. Qualitatively and 
quantitatively, navies were altering fast in this period, but none felt the pressure 
more than the number one naval power.
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The revolution in naval affairs that so threatened Britain, its imperial posses-
sions and maritime routes, and the Royal Navy in the two decades between around 
1885 and around 1905 was eventually handled, and greatly eased, not by some phe-
nomenal new technological deus ex machina, as Admiral Fisher and other reform-
ers sought, but through diplomacy—that is, by important changes in great power 
relationships that took place between Britain and the other nations precisely in 
these years. In the Mediterranean, Turkey, Spain, and Austria-Hungary remained 
overall friendly, and Italy very much so. In the Far East, Japan signed an alliance 
with Britain, crushed Russian land forces, and smashed the Russian battle fleet 
(1905). In the Western Hemisphere, the rising American power was accommodat-
ed through territorial concessions and a political rapprochement. Most important 
of all, Britain entered into a series of colonial agreements between 1904 and 1907 
with its two greatest overseas rivals, France and Russia, which (provided they were 
kept) took away their threats to the empire, and of course to the imperial sea-lanes. 
The nightmares of the 1890s were receding, although it was understandable that 
most admirals did not at first understand what was happening, and many feared 
that the new French and Russian rapprochements might not last. By any objective 
strategical measurement, however, Britain’s global position was far more secure by 
1906 than it had been, say, in 1890. And, to repeat an earlier point, all these diplo-
matic realignments could, and most probably would, have taken place even had the 
German fleet remained small and friendly.
Seen in this light, the final phase of the long nineteenth century (1906–14) is 
easier to comprehend and requires only a few broad strokes here. The new Ger-
man Navy was being built, by Tirpitz’s intent, to affect British policy and to make 
London more amenable to Berlin. It was to be a very large but short-range battle-
fleet navy, and thus to have its greatest influence between Wilhelmshaven and the 
Thames. German public opinion was now virulently hostile, and German diplo-
macy under the kaiser unpredictable. As pressures eased upon Britain’s world po-
sition, a new danger seemed to have arisen much closer to home. British warship 
numbers were trimmed in the Far East, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and on 
lesser stations. Land for a new battleship base was prudently purchased at Rosyth 
as early as 1903. The new Dreadnought battleship and Invincible-class battle cruiser 
appeared after 1906; they had not been designed deliberately against Germany, of 
course, but now they were there—and the swift German intention to follow suit 
showed that the new High Seas Fleet would stay as the chief threat to Britain’s 
maritime security, and the more frightening because so close. The Anglo-German 
naval race consumed all the headlines, agitated the British Parliament, and gripped 
successive British governments.17
But Britain’s security position was made much easier by the military-strategical 
decisions of two men: Gen. Alfred von Schlieffen and Grand Adm. Alfred von 
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Tirpitz. Schlieffen and the Prussian Army planners who followed him played such 
a vital, albeit negative, role because they completely ruled out the diversion of their 
armies for an invasion of England. It would have been very difficult to carry out 
such an invasion in any case, but it simply was not going to happen, because the 
Prussian General Staff ’s obsession throughout this time was the swift invasion of 
France, via Belgium (possibly also via the Netherlands as well), as well as gigantic 
campaigns in the east. This prospect meant that, like it or not, British governments 
now had to consider a threat to the European land balance of power for the first 
time in a century—a contingency for which the Royal Navy, not liking this at all, 
would also have to adjust. And Tirpitz eased Britain’s strategical dilemmas, ironi-
cally, by his unwavering insistence upon constructing a German Navy solely, or 
overwhelmingly, for deployment in the North Sea—the pre-1914 naval archives 
show him firmly resisting all schemes to have a larger German naval presence in 
the Mediterranean and outside Europe, as reducing the effect of his “lever point” 
against Britain in home waters.18 So it was with reluctance that he viewed the ex-
istence of Souchon’s small force in the Mediterranean and of von Spee’s squadron 
in the Far East. By the same token, Tirpitz opposed allocating large monies for 
enhancing naval harbors in the German colonies. So long as he held office, British 
imperial trade routes were not, despite any apprehensions, going to be in much 
danger in the years before 1914.
The historian is left only to speculate how the naval strategical situation would 
have looked had pre-1914 German governments decided instead to construct and 
then deploy squadrons of fast, powerful cruisers and battle cruisers, and even lesser 
squadrons, in ports in West Africa, Southwest Africa, East Africa, New Guinea, 
Samoa, the Carolines, and Tsingtao, instead of laying down yet another expensive 
battleship flotilla for the High Seas Fleet. Would this have seemed like a new ver-
sion of that scarcely faded nightmare of powerful French squadrons at Dakar and 
Madagascar? Probably not, because Germany could offer a far weaker logistical 
support system to an overseas base network than could France. Yet because Tirpitz 
prevailed in his fight against the German Admiralty Staff, that alternative strategy 
did not happen. Instead, and ironically, the natural geographical advantages that 
the Royal Navy had had against the Dutch challenge in the seventeenth century 
now returned, almost as an act of strategic good fortune, to hem in the newer naval 
challenge of the kaiser’s improperly named High Seas Fleet. Sea power had not di-
minished in importance, of course; it simply was returning to manifest itself in an 
older, familiar locale.
1914–18
The prewar constellation of prior diplomatic arrangements, military preparations, 
and the overall “correlation of forces,” as well as the unalterable geographical situ-
ation, thus set limits and opportunities for the workings of sea power after 1914, 
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affecting both the Allies and the Central Powers alike. The existing military plans 
and contractual arrangements of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany meant 
that a vast land struggle, far from the sea, would take place once decision makers 
in those capitals decided upon war rather than further negotiation. One of those 
contracts—namely, France’s commitment to its ally Russia—triggered Berlin’s dec-
laration of war upon Paris and brought the conflict to Western Europe as well. 
While a fight against Russia and France seemed deeply satisfying to many among 
Berlin’s leadership during the July crisis of 1914, the rigidity of their Schlieffen Plan 
actually meant that Germany first attacked neutral Belgium, thus triggering the 
intervention of Britain and its empire against the Central Powers, and turning the 
struggle into a true “world” war. Wilhelmine Germany was now simultaneously 
engaged in a massive land conflict and a premature maritime struggle against a far 
larger naval power—all this, unsurprisingly, to Tirpitz’s dismay and frustration. In 
his view, Berlin had unwisely and prematurely pushed for a conflict in 1914; there 
was no sleepwalking into war here.19 And Tirpitz had fair cause for dismay, for, 
while there were good prospects for a militarily efficient Germany to overcome its 
next-door neighbors, at sea the odds were badly tilted against the High Seas Fleet.
Several early actions in the war confirmed Germany’s weaknesses overseas, but, 
coincidentally, other events in the southern North Sea and at the Dardanelles sug-
gested that sea power’s effectiveness along the littoral waters of a huge continent 
had been greatly changed and reduced since the age of fighting sail. On the declara-
tion of war, Germany’s two relatively small overseas squadrons were left exposed, 
like foxes in an open field. Because Britain’s Far East ally, Japan, came immediately 
into the war in order to seize Germany’s possessions in north China and the Cen-
tral Pacific islands, Adm. Graf von Spee’s squadron had no alternative but to flee 
across the entire Pacific to the tip of South America, where it smashed a very weak 
Royal Navy cruiser group at Coronel (November 1914) before in turn being elimi-
nated at the Battle of the Falkland Islands (December 1914) by a force of fast battle 
cruisers sent out by Admiral Fisher from home waters. One could say that imperial 
flotilla defense was working here, then, but afterward there was nothing for HMS 
Inflexible and Invincible to do but to come home, to risk more dangerous close-
water threats (HMS Inflexible was heavily damaged by Turkish shore batteries and a 
mine at the Dardanelles, beached, and then recovered) or face Germany’s powerful 
squadrons in the North Sea (HMS Invincible was sunk by plunging fire at Jutland).
Secondly, and even earlier, von Souchon’s Goeben and Breslau had fled through 
the Mediterranean and forced themselves for refuge at Constantinople, thus partly 
helping to bring Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers (also in 
November 1914), which in turn led to Anglo-French counteractions and expan-
sion across the Middle East. With an Allied naval blockade in operation in the 
Atlantic and the Channel and from Gibraltar, and with all Germany’s overseas cable 
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communications cut off, there would be no great naval campaigning in overseas 
waters in this particular war. And Italy’s entry into the conflict (May 1915) kept 
Austria-Hungary’s fleet bottled up as well. Naval clashes in the Baltic and Black 
Seas were interesting, but local affairs. Only America remained as a major neutral 
force, albeit tied by finance, trade, and communications much more to the Allied 
side. So the greater part of this war was, in essence, a giant Mackinder-ite land 
struggle, with surface navies operating at the margins; it could not help being so.20
The destruction of Germany’s prospects overseas suggested that the workings 
of sea power were running in Britain’s direction, but further encounters pointed 
to another, unsettling fact: the coming of certain nineteenth-century technolo-
gies, when converted into weapons systems, was going to curb the application of 
maritime force along well-defended hostile shores, and even a bit farther out. In 
October 1914, a single enemy mine sank the new battleship HMS Audacious off 
northern Ireland, a stunning example of what one would later call “asymmetrical 
warfare” and a precedent that deeply worried Jellicoe. Even before then, in Septem-
ber 1914, three large cruisers (HMS Aboukir, Hogue, and Crecy) patrolling off the 
Dutch coast were sunk by a small, elderly U-boat, causing the loss of a staggering 
1,400 British sailors. As Corbett put it in his official history, “nothing that had yet 
occurred had so emphatically proclaimed the change that had come over naval 
warfare.”21 Close blockade was supposed to have been given up as Admiralty prac-
tice years before the war; now it decidedly was.
This left the far easier practice of the distant blockade of Germany’s maritime 
commerce, taking advantage of Britain’s favorable position over the entrances to the 
North Sea. Yet the hoped-for “squeeze” upon the German economy did not work 
as decisively as in prewar planning, partly because the Central Powers (with their 
extensive grain fields of the east) were to be largely self-sustaining in food supplies 
for much of the war, and partly because angry American protests about the inter-
ruption of neutral shipping slowed down the operation of the seaborne blockade 
of German commerce.22 Economic warfare against the Central Powers took many 
forms—the cutting of cable communications, the suspension of German credits, 
the simple fact that the huge Anglo-German mutual trade spluttered to a halt (as 
did, of course, all German-Russian and German-French economic exchanges), the 
closing down of the access to British shipping for German goods, the purchase 
of supplies overseas that might otherwise have gone to Germany, and the now- 
cautious inspection of neutral shipping on the high seas—but the effects of this 
could not be swift, and the whole process was obviously much less visible to the 
public and their governments than the battles of the Marne and Tannenberg. Ironi-
cally, of course, land warfare was also to show itself less decisive and promising 
by the time of Ypres (1915), causing the generals on both sides to call for an ever-
greater share of resources and manpower they now needed for carrying out vast, 
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industrialized warfare. All prewar planning assumptions, for land and sea, seemed 
confounded.
While it was patently clear that in this war the Royal Navy could not operate in 
the Baltic as it had done in the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars, Admiralty planners 
and their pugnacious First Lord, Churchill, did still think that they could strike at 
Constantinople and alter the outcome of the war in the Black Sea and across East-
ern Europe itself.23 However, the disaster that hit the first naval operations against 
the Dardanelles—the loss and crippling of so many British and French battleships 
upon the Turkish-laid minefields on the single day of March 18, 1915—was not 
only spectacular and devastating in itself. It finally confirmed that the older ap-
plication of naval force against enemy shores was now impossible in a new age of 
small, “killer” weapons like the mine, torpedoes, entrenched coastal gunnery, fast 
torpedo boats, and submarines (the bombing of warships by aircraft had not yet 
arrived).
Then the second stage of the Dardanelles campaign—the failure of ever-larger 
Allied armies to break through at Gallipoli and advance upon Constantinople—
showed that the classic weapon of amphibious warfare was also crimped unless the 
invading forces were to be far better equipped and trained than they were at this 
time. Future militaries like the U.S. Marine Corps at Okinawa learned much from 
studying the failures of the Allies at the Dardanelles.24 At the time, of course, that 
meant nothing. What seemed to be happening was that while the Central Powers 
were quite unable to shake the Allied command of the oceans, the Allies could do 
little or nothing to hurt their foes from the sea. Worst of all, of course, France and 
Britain also could do nothing to help their beleaguered Russian ally except, so their 
high commands argued, by massively increasing land pressures along the Western 
Front.
But the greatest confounding of the hopes of Allied sea power advocates lay 
where they had expected a decisive blow against the German Navy to occur—in the 
North Sea itself. Geography was not a friend to Jellicoe here. Enemy vessels operat-
ing from Wilhelmshaven could get to England’s east coast more swiftly than could 
the Grand Fleet coming out of Scapa Flow, and even when the two navies met the 
actions were fast, furious, confused, and attended by mists, poor communications, 
and the failure of command and control. What therefore took place between 1914 
and 1916 in these North Sea encounters was much more of a cat-and-mouse game 
than a decisive battle-fleet action like Trafalgar. Early German bombardments of 
the towns of Scarborough and Whitby shocked the British nation, so the Admi-
ralty had to conjure up a credible response in these new and trying circumstances. 
The Grand Fleet could not be relocated south with individual battleship squadrons 
based in the Tyne, Humber, Harwich, and the Thames, for bringing them together 
again off, say, Scarborough Head would be a signals nightmare (signals turned out 
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to be a great Royal Navy weakness), and the possibility of one of them getting into 
a running fight with Hipper’s dangerous battle cruisers or even Scheer’s entire fleet 
was too daunting to contemplate. The best that could be done, and this was sensible 
enough, was to base Beatty’s battle cruisers at Rosyth and to fill southern ports such 
as Harwich with cruiser and destroyer flotillas—and rely upon the Germans’ loose 
wireless chatter to indicate when the High Seas Fleet might be emerging. Thus 
the Grand Fleet would stay far up north—leaving Jellicoe, however, with another 
operational problem: should it, upon alert, steam south as fast as possible, shrug-
ging off the risk of newly strewn enemy mines, or proceed instead at around eight 
knots behind a screen of minesweepers, making things easier for U-boat attack, 
and being also possibly too late to help an outnumbered Beatty? Clearly, Rodney 
and Nelson had had no such problems.
All these reminders of space and weather puts the Anglo-German North Sea 
surface fleet encounters—off the Yorkshire coast, the Dogger Bank, even Jutland—
in their context. The historian of an exact century later should be wary of being 
smart after these events. Jellicoe, Beatty, and Tyrwhitt were nervous, excited, and 
worried about a battle scenario that could emerge from the mists in less than fifteen 
minutes, and so, surely even more so, were Hipper and his bleary-eyed lookouts 
on the German side. Yet it is impossible to accept Churchill’s hyperbolic claim that 
Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon. While the 
Dogger Bank clash delivered to the Germans a salutary spanking and a warning, 
Jutland in turn gave the thinly protected British battle cruisers a hammering and 
the nation a blow to its pride; gave both historians and participants the stuff for 
endless postmortems, claims and counterclaims; and also gave rise to a large litera-
ture, much predictable and of relatively low value.25 It has never been shown—for 
how could it be?—that even if the Grand Fleet had lost, say, six capital ships and 
not three, the overall maritime balance the day after Jutland would have been much 
different. Nor does a British claim much matter that, had its deficient shells been 
replaced before the war, the hits that occurred on six further German battleships 
would have been fatal ones. Improved fire control here or improved shells there 
were simply not the point. Strategically, Jutland changed nothing. The British na-
tion was understandably shocked at the loss of 6,094 seamen. But on July 1, 1916, 
on the first day of the Somme, the British Army lost 19,240 men out of a total of 
57,500 casualties—and the British press moved on. The German High Command 
didn’t care about Jutland, nor about an invasion of England. So what was Jellicoe 
to have lost?
The historian can be brief about what was left.26 If the German Admiralty wished 
to bring the British nation to its knees after 1916, it seemed it had no practical al-
ternative but to initiate full-scale and unrestricted U-boat warfare against mercan-
tile commerce in the Atlantic, whether Allied or neutral. It thus traded off a high 
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political risk against its increasing post-Jutland naval ineffectiveness, and by April 
1917 that risk playing had led to the entry of the United States into the conflict. 
That was simply too much. Provoking the British Empire into this struggle ensured 
that Germany would not win the First World War; provoking the Americans also to 
enter meant that Germany would lose. The odds, as A. J. P. Taylor pointed out sixty 
years ago, were simply too great.27
This did not mean that the naval situation for the Allies immediately became 
any easier, but it did become very different. Success in the maritime conflict was 
now counted by the tonnage of merchantmen sunk versus the number of U-boats 
destroyed and, above all, by the successful flow of New World foodstuffs, muni-
tions, and fighting men to British and French ports during 1917 and 1918. And 
the losses of merchant ships were huge and frightening—3.6 million tons in six 
months—yet they were never enough to achieve the German Admiralty Staff ’s pur-
pose. And the British return to the older practice of convoy gave the operational 
and tactical advantage to the Allied escorting fleets; if the U-boats wanted to score, 
they would have to attack the convoys and thus provoke counterattack.
Obviously, in this great struggle, neither the Grand Fleet nor the High Seas Fleet 
counted very much, except as a manpower drain, and as neutralizing each other. To 
return to a consideration of the three grand theories about sea power mentioned 
above, one might conclude that the eventual Allied victory in late 1918 chiefly 
came, not from a big battle-fleet struggle in the North Sea (Mahan) but from the 
linked strategies of keeping open the North Atlantic lines of communication (Cor-
bett) while beating off Ludendorff ’s bid for land supremacy (Mackinder). This was 
difficult for fleet admirals and their later historians to swallow.
This did not, of course, mean that sea power had not worked at all, but that it 
had operated, and worked, in a very different context from that anticipated by most 
prewar planners and policy makers. When the conflict opened, the signal was sent 
out that “The King’s Ships Were at Sea,” and so they were, or at least the smaller 
patrolling vessels and the submarines were.28 But the heavier surface warships came 
out infrequently, not only because the waters were dangerous but also, importantly, 
because their actual presence at sea was ever less necessary. The preponderance of 
naval force, plus geography, had ensured Allied naval supremacy in any case. It just 
was harder to explain that when the war ended and the leaders of the victor powers 
assembled at Versailles. The advocates of the influence of sea power had a far easier 
time of it after 1815 and 1945.
1919–39
There was to be no long century of relative naval peace following 1919, but in 
the mere twenty-year interlude a remarkable amount did occur that would affect 
the workings of navies. History speeded things up, as it were. One hundred years 
afterward, one can see rather better than did contemporaries why the very special 
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international and domestic circumstances after the First World War wrought havoc 
upon any traditional attempts to develop a naval policy; indeed, wrought havoc 
upon the usual ways of thinking about sea power itself. The new features to this al-
tered strategical landscape were daunting, and admirals everywhere, and the policy 
makers who controlled them, were at first understandably daunted, distracted, and 
confused by all this.29 By the second half of the 1920s, however, the landscape of 
world affairs had settled down a bit and seemed altogether more reassuring.
With a suspicious U.S. Senate and American public forcing Woodrow Wilson 
and his successors to pull back from leading the efforts to create a post-1919 world 
order, it was left to policy makers in London, Paris, Rome, and other capitals to 
shape the contours within which navies would operate and naval planners would 
work. What is clear is that the challenges uppermost in the minds of Lloyd George 
and his political contemporaries were very definitely not those of, say, Admirals 
Jellicoe and Beatty.
How could they be? Germany and Austria-Hungary had collapsed, and there 
was the threat of international mayhem across Eastern Europe as new nationalist 
forces strove to establish boundaries and governments. Most of the regular armies 
of the First World War had dissolved and gone home, leaving those of France, 
Belgium, and Italy, intact if vastly reduced. Polish, White Russian, and Bolshe-
vik forces fought on, with Lenin eventually gaining a breathing space for his new, 
puzzling regime. All this, of course, took place on land, indeed on Mackinder’s 
very “heartland” of the Ukraine, and therefore had little to do with the Western 
admiralties’ efforts to create their postwar international order. Urgent European 
issues—on boundaries, war debts, reparations, plebiscites, working out League of 
Nations practices, and carrying out old-fashioned-type great-power diplomacy at 
places like Lausanne and Locarno—took most of the headlines of the day; to France 
especially all this was crucial. In parallel to negotiations over the Saarland and up-
per Silesia were those over the future boundaries of the entire Middle East, but even 
here naval considerations played no role because there was no challenge to Brit-
ish and French imperial dominance, and nor was there in Africa. Commonwealth 
navies were shrinking and Commonwealth armies dissolving, following the Amer-
ican lead. All the civilized (sic) Western world seemed to want was for its armies to 
come home, allowing governments instead to focus upon reconstruction and social 
priorities, in which context all defense expenditures had to be brutally cut. Gener-
als were now despised, and navies told to find their place and think themselves 
lucky that their budgets were not further slashed.
Despite the navalists’ dismay, this was not the end of sea power, and in fact 
the setting of reduced, economy-based priorities by the governments in Wash-
ington, London, and Paris gave navies a rather good, if limited, circumstance in 
which to “find their place.” All the admirals—including the Japanese, French, and 
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Italian—kicked, screamed, and protested as they were forced into the straitjacket of 
the powerful clauses of the Washington Treaties of 1921–22, but when their navies 
emerged from this harrowing experience into the placid years of the later 1920s 
things did not seem so bad after all. Even the very fact that warship sizes were 
standardized by displacement and gun caliber grew to be reassuring to planners 
and designers; a heavy cruiser had eight-inch guns, a light cruiser less than six-
inch guns. Each class—carriers, battleships, cruisers—was neatly described and 
circumscribed.
The German Navy was no more, chiefly sunk at its own hands; the French Navy 
was under firm political control; the Italian Navy small and inward-looking; and no 
other European navies counted. Sea power, as manifested by large fleets, was held 
by the three great navies of Britain, the United States, and Japan, and all were being 
compelled to find their diminished position within their nation’s current list of pri-
orities. Treaties established the maritime status quo regarding territories and naval 
bases across the Far East and Pacific; and in the Atlantic and Mediterranean the 
Royal Navy enjoyed an uncontested superiority, with the French and Italian navies 
well behind. The American and British admiralties were still going to quarrel over 
cruiser sizes and numbers right through until the London Naval Treaty of 1930, but 
this was a mild affair compared with prewar passions. A better expression of what 
was going on might be captured in photographs of the great harbor of Hong Kong 
in these years, with the 5th RN Cruiser Squadron at anchor, under their awnings, 
while in the distance a few American warships peacefully took in fuel and other 
supplies. In the Mediterranean, French, British, and Italian vessels paid port visits. 
Not much else was going on. The age of frantic navalism was over.
The most interesting aspect to the story of evolving sea power in these years 
was not, therefore, navies, and certainly not traditional battle fleets, but the emerg-
ing newer technologies of warfare, especially in the air. Both the Royal Navy and 
the U.S. Navy experimented keenly with “flattops” after 1919, and although those 
very early vessels like HMS Argus and USS Langley were small and primitive it is 
really remarkable how swiftly the speed, displacement, size, and striking power of 
subsequent carriers became [greater]. HMS Ark Royal, for example, was laid down 
less than twenty years after Argus had put to sea. And the later carriers had to be so 
much bigger because aircraft in general were so much more powerful—the ships 
had to have a longer space for both takeoff and landing. The new dive-bombers, 
torpedo bombers, and high-level aircraft flew more swiftly, carried greater arma-
ments, and came in so fast. The admirals may have pooh-poohed Billy Mitchell’s 
claims in 1920, but by the late 1930s it is noticeable that all heavy warships, battle-
ships, cruisers, and carriers were having ever more antiaircraft guns fitted. More 
importantly—at least as far as the Royal Navy was concerned, since it operated 
chiefly in European waters—the threat might come more from land-based air 
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power than from enemy carrier aircraft. Early in the First World War, mines and 
torpedoes had made a close-in naval blockade a thing of the past. But what if the 
threat of land-based aircraft pushed the more powerful navy into operating farther 
and farther from the shore? How limited was sea power’s “influence” then?
The years after 1936 saw changes come thick and fast for all the major navies. 
The historically distorting naval “holiday” in capital-ship building was at an end, 
as were the total caps on fleet tonnages. Naval construction surged forward, in the 
British case in the form of the new King George V–class battleships, Illustrious -class 
fleet carriers, Town-class cruisers, and flotillas of fleet destroyers.30 The American 
Navy also grew rapidly in the late 1930s, although it was not until the third Vinson-
Trammel Act of June 1940 and the Two-Ocean Navy Act of the following month 
that legislation went through that would make it the largest naval force in the world 
by 1944. The three revisionist, fascist states were also investing heavily in new 
fleets. Italy was laying down powerful, fast battleships and heavy cruisers (although 
no aircraft carriers). Hitler’s huge rearmament schemes also encompassed the 
German Navy, and if its initial laying downs were not large, they were enough to 
have London seek the controversial Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1936), a 
desperate effort to achieve a one-power standard in home waters while also being 
able to send a fleet to the Far East as large as Japan’s. But the Japanese were also re-
building, way beyond that calculus. Everyone was building, running faster to keep 
up, just as the shapes of the wartime coalitions of power took shadowy form. The 
Axis trio was moving: Italy in Ethiopia (1935), in Spain (1937), and in the Balkans 
(1939); Japan in China (1937); and Hitler across central Europe (1938–39). Britain 
and France stood once more together, diplomatically and navally, by 1939. The 
USSR desperately bought time, as did a neutralist, geographically favored United 
States.
In sum, by the eve of the Second World War sea power—always a different thing 
from navies, or from naval policies, or from naval technologies—possessed a form 
both familiar and yet unfamiliar. Command over the surface waters of the Atlantic 
Ocean, and of the Mediterranean, was being asserted, by the battle fleets of the pre-
vailing Western navies (Mahan); and plans were simultaneously being made to pro-
tect the enormous yet scattered flocks of individual merchant ships making their 
way to port (Corbett). One giant commercial map of November 1937 shows the 
streams of little dots headed to British ports from La Plata, from the West Indies, 
around the Cape, past Freetown, through the Mediterranean.31 And even two years 
later those Elder Dempster, Blue Funnel, P&O, and Compagnie de Suez merchant 
vessels must have all seemed reasonably safe. The Axis navies were locked into the 
North Sea and Mediterranean, and in the absence of a High Seas Fleet the surface 
balance of power was even more favorably tilted toward London and Paris than it 
had been in 1914.
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But those vast numbers of Allied merchantmen were also more vulnerable be-
cause the greatest threat to their security now came not from hostile surface raiders 
but from an undersea menace that challenged the power of regular fleets to claim 
command of the oceans and threatened merchant fleets, grain carriers, oil tankers, 
and ocean liners alike. This was not completely new, of course; as described above, 
the early submarines had already shown their threatening capacities, in the North 
Sea by 1916, in the Atlantic by 1917. But many a traditional admiral, in Japan no 
less than in the West, had tried to brush away that fact, and the cozy international 
scene and naval holidays of the 1920s helped to perpetuate the illusion. And illu-
sion it was. Four centuries of surface sea power, from Hawkins’s Revenge to the new 
Ark Royal itself (sunk by a German submarine on November 13, 1941), had been 
an impressive historical “long phase” in the larger story of the advance of the West. 
But a new age had commenced, lasting to the present, whereby surface sea power, 
when under way upon the high seas, would always be vulnerable to an attack out 
of the deep.
In those same few years, from roughly 1930 to 1940, the engine power, speed, 
carrying capacity, and range of the modern bomber aircraft greatly increased in 
size. This became a mixed bonus to navies. The striking power and reach of the 
newer Japanese, American, and British carriers rose greatly, but so did the danger 
from their foes’ carrier fleets, and the nascent threat from land-based aircraft (from 
Stuka dive-bombers to the later high-level B-17s) was a completely new factor. 
While the Anglo-French surface fleets stood in great numerical superiority over 
those of their foes at the end of the 1930s, what did that mean if hostile air power 
could threaten their security, and thus their operating maritime effectiveness, up to 
one hundred or more miles off a theater of war? What did it mean in the Pacific and 
Southeast Asia if a newer, Japanese, carrier-based air power threatened the Allied 
hold over the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore? What did it mean, closer to 
home, when Italian land-based air power threatened to drive its foes’ fleets out of 
the central Mediterranean?
When war broke out again in 1939, therefore, the Royal Navy may have been 
still the leading navy by count of the numbers, and to this could be added the 
considerable French fleets, plus the preponderance in naval bases possessed by the 
Anglo-French powers. Yet number counting alone clearly was not a true measure 
of the strategical balances. In September 1939, as Churchill resumed his position as 
First Lord, the British Admiralty proudly announced, “Winston Is Back!,” suggest-
ing that things were [again] much the same as in 1914. They were not, on at least 
two significant counts. While Italy and Japan remained initially neutral, they were 
obviously potential foes and had to be regarded as such, giving the Royal Navy a 
much more serious fleet distributional problem than it had had in 1914. And, sec-
ondly, there was now the question of how much air power’s potential would be of 
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greater advantage to Britain’s foes than to the number one maritime nation itself. 
Finally, looming in the background, although a concern of only a few thoughtful 
observers of geopolitics, there was the even larger question of how Western Euro-
pean maritime power would fare in a new era structured by the emergence of giant 
nations—real superpowers.
1939 –45
The Second World War was so immense that it is better understood as five great 
(and interrelated) conflicts rather than as a single struggle for supremacy. From 
1937 until 1945, a gigantic land war raged throughout much of China, as the Impe-
rial Japanese Army committed over one million men to crush the Nationalists, who 
were in turn trying to crush the Communists. From 1941 onward, an even greater 
land struggle took place along the entire western front of the USSR in a fight to the 
death between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army (with approximately three mil-
lion German and five million Soviet men in the initial fighting alone). Across the 
vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, with outlier campaigns that ranged westward to 
the Indian border, a third great struggle, mainly maritime-amphibious, was waged 
between Japan’s forces and those of the American-Australian-British commands 
and forces. Eight thousand miles away, and starting over two years earlier, another 
geographically widespread war was fought between Britain and its allies and the 
German-Italian coalition; its scope was small in 1939–40, though it soon ranged 
from Archangel to Abyssinia, and from Newfoundland to Egypt, and all the wa-
ters in between. And from 1942 onward, a great Anglo-American double strategic 
bombing campaign was unleashed against the Third Reich from hundreds of Brit-
ish (and later Sicilian-Italian) air bases, as another, and independent, form of win-
ning the war.
All five grand campaigns were interconnected, to a greater or lesser extent, with 
the Chinese-Japanese War having the fewest links to the other fighting. All five 
campaigns have each attracted a vast historiography, with the majority of the writ-
ings focusing solely on their own zones of battle, often laying claim to its signifi-
cance for the final victory, sometimes even querying the size or the importance of 
another campaign.32 This is not necessary in any proper assessment of the influence 
of sea power upon the Second World War, for the significance of the great battles 
of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean are incontestable; and it is clear that 
the Anglo-American leadership saw those theaters as interlinked, as they shifted 
warships, air squadrons, and landing craft from one to the other as they judged 
necessary. And there are other linkages: neither the giant Anglo-American stra-
tegic bombing campaign nor the Normandy landings were possible without the 
Allied naval escorts getting the invaluable convoys safely across the North Atlantic; 
the bombing of German railways and submarine pens hurt U-boat production and 
crippled overall Wehrmacht communications; and seaborne/landborne supplies 
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from the Western Allies gave far greater help to the Red Army than is usually ac-
knowledged, while the same strategic bombing also significantly diverted large re-
sources of German manpower and material to home defense that could have been 
used on the Eastern Front.33 As the war went on, certain Luftflotte Fliegerkorps 
were juggled by Goering’s staff between the Mediterranean, Eastern, and French/
Atlantic fronts, just as many British warships went from Mediterranean operations 
to Arctic convoy duties to Atlantic campaigning. Few if any leaders and their advis-
ers viewed the war with complete balance, and holistically, although the meetings 
of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff did their best in this regard. 
Viewing sea power within this larger, grand-strategical framework best lets his-
torians see where and how it worked, as well as where it played little or no role. 
In the hard-fought campaigning of 1939 to 1942 in the Western theaters of war—
where Britain fought to maintain itself as the major military power—sea power’s 
importance was undoubted, and was virtually everywhere. The Battle of the At-
lantic, where hostilities began on the first day, was, after all, the longest campaign 
of the war, and convoys were already under attack and Royal Navy warships being 
sunk even during the so-called Phony War period. The diplomacy of the late 1930s 
had set up the battlefield: Hitler’s attack upon Poland drew France and Britain into 
the fighting, which then escalated greatly with the explosive German assaults upon 
the Low Countries, Denmark, and Norway. Those losses to the Western alliance 
would have been great enough, but in May–June 1940 the largest strategical change 
since Napoleonic times occurred when France itself was toppled.
In less than two months, therefore, Britain had forfeited all its usual geograph- 
ical advantages, save that incomparable one of being an island-state, protected by 
its moat. Its control of the two exits from the North Sea was no more. Back in the 
late 1920s, an obscure strategic writer named Rear Adm. Wolfgang Wegener had 
argued that in a future war the only way that Germany could escape the geographi-
cal “trap” that it had occupied in 1914–18 would be to have naval bases in Norway 
or in western France; now it had both.34 This huge transformation of the balances 
made the fighting at sea ever more important and fierce. The Royal Navy lost many 
ships itself as it mauled its German foe badly in the Norwegian campaign. As it 
pulled the British and French armies out of Dunkirk, it encountered more losses 
from Luftwaffe attacks. German bombers hammered away at British shipbuilding 
yards. German submarines, from their new advanced bases, punished the convoys 
severely.
Italy’s entry into the war, just after the fall of France, made an awful strategic 
situation for Britain now close to catastrophic.35 The loss of the French ally and 
the entry of the Italian fleet involved a “swing” of literally hundreds of warships, 
and even when the French fleet was brutally neutralized the plain fact was that 
Britain no longer had control of the Mediterranean. For the next two and a half 
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years that sea became the most contested naval theater in all of history, and war-
ships and merchantmen littered the seabeds from off Crete to the approaches to 
Malta. In these years, without a doubt, the Royal Navy had its own “finest hour.” In 
these years, as Churchill and his cabinet realized, keeping command of the sea was 
elemental, vital, urgent . . . and so very precarious. The reader of the narrative of 
a Malta convoy—say, the epic Operation PEDESTAL convoy battle of August 11–13, 
1942—comes away awed at the intensity of the fighting by the British, Italian, and 
German units thrown into the struggle.36
The Battle of the Atlantic was even larger, more widespread, and more costly; 
in 1940, the Allies lost 3.9 million tons of merchant shipping, chiefly to surface 
attacks and U-boats but some also to German aircraft and to mines; in 1941 that 
total jumped to 4.3 million tons, including seven merchant ships in the foray by 
the cruiser Hipper; and in 1942 the total was a terrifying 7.8 million tons.37 Then 
the fourth year of the campaign started badly for the convoys. It was shortly af-
ter March 1943, when no fewer than four convoys had been torn into by U-boat 
wolf pack attacks and some 627,000 further tons lost, that the official Admiralty 
record read, “The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications be-
tween the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March, 1943.”38 
Here, clearly, was Corbett’s claim that sea power equaled command of the maritime 
routes most clearly evidenced. Here also was made clear the stark fact: unless con-
trol of the sea routes to Britain was maintained, there would be little or no strategic 
bombing (the fuel for the air squadrons could only come by tanker) and no Allied 
landings in France (for the equipment for two million U.S. soldiers could not cross 
the Atlantic unless it was protected).
It is true that certain other Atlantic convoys were being successfully routed to 
avoid the U-boats altogether and thus successfully make it to the Clyde and Liv-
erpool. And it is also true that the enormous American shipbuilding effort was by 
this stage producing millions of tons of additional merchant shipping (11.5 million 
tons in 1943).39 Yet it is not at all certain that, had the U-boat packs not been driven 
out of the North Atlantic by the extraordinary Allied counteroffensives of April 
to June 1943, those additional stocks of shipping would have made much of a dif-
ference; if undefeated at sea, Dönitz’s increasingly larger wolf packs surely would 
have sunk more and more ships, and the dreadful losses of merchant-ship crews 
clearly was not sustainable. So the amazingly swift change of fortune that followed, 
with the German Navy losing forty-one U-boats in May 1943 alone, actually meant 
that a strategic watershed had been crossed. With the Allied control of the Atlantic 
convoy routes never again in such dire danger, the first of the Casablanca military 
directives had been achieved. Naval specialists will energetically debate which of the 
newer weapons of war made the greatest contributions to this sharp defeat of the 
U-boats (the list would include the coming of long-range patrol aircraft, the arrival 
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of the escort carriers, the astounding miniature radar [cavity magnetron] sets, plus 
hi-fi signals detection, improved depth charges, homing torpedoes, hunter- 
killer groups, and ULTRA signals-intelligence decrypts).40 But the chief point is that 
the greatest struggle ever for command of the sea had been fought, with the defend-
ing navies triumphing after a long, bloody contest.
With that vital maritime campaign won, the Anglo-American alliance could 
move to the next stages of the Casablanca military agenda and commence the 
amphibian counteroffensive against the Third Reich’s vulnerable, overextended, 
southernmost holdings. Geography again favored the Allies, for it was a lot easier 
to move invasion armies from the Clyde and Virginia to the shores of Morocco 
and Algeria than it was for the German High Command to send divisions from the 
Balkans to North Africa—especially at a time when the Wehrmacht was involved in 
the grinding maw that was Stalingrad. The Anglo-American forces were also lucky 
in that their large-scale landings were on undefended beaches—there was opposi-
tion neither to the large-scale Sicily landings in July 1943 nor to crossing the Straits 
of Messina into Italy proper the next month. Still, the Admiralty took no chances to 
ensure that these invasions went undisturbed; for example, not only did it provide 
enormous naval and aerial close support for the actions to take the Algerian ports, 
but it sent a heavily augmented Force H from Gibraltar into the Central Mediter-
ranean to deter any sorties by the Italian or Vichy French navies—altogether four 
fleet carriers, five smaller carriers, and six battleships were involved.41
All this experience proved immensely useful in the following year, when the 
Allies at last launched the largest amphibious operation of all time, against the 
Normandy beaches. All the Mediterranean commanders had been brought home 
(Eisenhower, Ramsay, Montgomery, Patton, and so on), as were the most expe-
rienced army divisions, and of course the navies and the amphibious units. In a 
very real degree, the Allied invasion of June 1944 was the apotheosis of Western 
sea power—the Admiralty insisted upon calling this “Operation NEPTUNE”—but 
the historian has also to note how integrated the naval side was with the forces of 
air power and land power. Five armies marched ashore on June 6, while no less 
than 11,400 (!) aircraft were aloft that day over western France and the Channel. 
German torpedo boats and U-boats were ordered to interrupt the invasion, but 
they all understood this was a suicide mission and called it so.42 In other words, 
the entire littoral of Western Europe was under Allied aerial dominance. (One can 
again notice the difference with the situation around 1917, when Jellicoe’s fleets 
kept carefully to the other side of the North Sea.) The D-day operation was indeed 
stupendous, and yet in the very same month of June 1944 the Red Army launched 
its most enormous land advance against the Third Reich yet, Operation BAGRA-
TION, involving 1,700,000 troops.
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By contrast, the battle of the Pacific was a war concerning sea power through 
and through. Japan’s first six months of expansion, using its fleets, air forces, and a 
relatively small military force to seize an astonishing amount of territory, ranging 
from the Philippines to the Burma-India border, was spearheaded by an extremely 
well-equipped and well-trained carrier force accompanied by supporting cruiser 
and destroyer flotillas and expeditionary armies. The Royal Navy especially was ill 
prepared for this and suffered defeat after defeat, with the loss of Prince of Wales 
and Repulse, the stunning surrender of Singapore, and the further losses in the In-
dian Ocean. America’s losses, of the Philippines and the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
were even greater; but the critically strategic position of Hawaii was not taken, nor 
was the U.S. carrier fleet at all damaged, and both were to be of immense value 
when the counteroffensive came. 
Tokyo’s aim was to establish a secure perimeter ring around its recently acquired 
possessions and then, nourished by the oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo that had 
been the real object of its southern drive, to resume its massive landward com-
paigns into mainland China. America’s aim was to recover all the territories lost, 
to smash the Japanese forces in the Pacific, and to inflict an overwhelming defeat 
upon the Japanese nation itself. There would be no great landmass over which this 
war would be fought, but instead vast distances at sea, with the advantage going to 
the side that readjusted best to the novel logistical and operational requirements. 
And there would also be no great Battle of the Atlantic fight over convoys. The rein-
forcement route from America’s West Coast to Australia was not contested, and in 
any case the Japanese submarine force did not focus upon a war against merchant-
men but acted in support of its own battle fleets. And the American submarine 
attacks upon Japanese merchant shipping, while murderously effective after the 
torpedo defects had been remedied, came late in the day, in 1944 and 1945.
By that stage, the main contours of the war in the Pacific had become evident, 
with sea power playing the central role, albeit in a new hybrid form that merged it 
with air power and amphibian power. This was most clearly manifested in the mas-
sive forces that were assembled under Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific Command 
and in the operations they carried out in an irreversible drive across the Pacific, is-
land group by island group: from Hawaii to the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls, 
Carolines, and Marianas, then on to Iwo Jima and Okinawa and the approaches 
to Japan. Although every one of these operations had their own separate features, 
there was a common operational pattern: the arrival of a large number of carrier 
task forces to gain control of the air and punish any Japanese warships and bases 
(including major ones, like Rabaul) in the region; the offshore pounding by heavy 
cruisers and battleships—in their new, non-Mahanian role—of the island’s land 
defenses; and then the amphibious assault itself.43 The land fighting was always fe-
rocious, but the garrisons were isolated, and no American assault was thrown back. 
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The last great Japanese counterattack was in their multipart operation at Leyte Gulf 
(October 1944), finally involving their Main Fleet. In retrospect, one can see that 
even this operation, with its various subplots to trap some of the American squad-
rons, would not have stayed the offensive tide for long; the U.S. economy, eight or 
possibly ten times greater than that of Japan, had now geared up to full production.
Around the middle of 1943, that great shift in the global power balances that 
had been building up, tectonically, since the 1890s and more obviously after the 
huge American defense spending near the end of the First World War showed itself 
in full display. In June 1943, the first of the new, fast, Essex-class fleet carriers, the 
USS Essex itself, slipped into Pearl Harbor. By August it was joined by another, the 
new USS Yorktown, and afterward by USS Intrepid—and twenty-one more. A new 
class of light fleet carriers was also streaming into the Pacific, accompanied by fast 
new destroyers and heavy and light cruisers. The mighty sixteen-inch-gun Iowa-
class battleships were not far behind. A galvanized American shipbuilding industry 
was also completing fast oilers to accompany the future long-range operations of 
the carrier groups, and hundreds and hundreds of landing craft for future amphib-
ian landings on the scattered Japanese-held islands. And, from Seattle (Boeing) to 
Long Island (Grumman), the U.S. aircraft industry poured out 85,898 aircraft in 
1943 alone, and a staggering 96,318 in 1944.44 Nothing compared.
All this now dated those older disputes between sea power and land power ad-
vocates, as Leo Amery had so presciently guessed it would when he made his amaz-
ingly insightful commentary upon Mackinder’s “Geographical Pivot of History” 
paper of April 1904.45 The chief thing to understand now was neither the display 
of great warship fleets occupying the high seas nor the successful control of the 
routes of trade, nor even the fight to defeat the giant Nazi land empire—all of them 
vital, epic, remarkable in their different ways—but the coming of continent-wide 
superpowers of “vast munitioning potential” that brought the winning of wars to a 
new level of force projection. In this narrative, one can certainly see how sea power 
influenced the outcome of the Second World War, not as the determinant but as the 
many-sided instrument of Allied force projection, in specific theaters, to a specific 
degree.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Sea power had played an enormously important part in the outcome of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. One hundred years later, however, during the 
second “Great War,” of 1914–18, it seemed both to participants and historians to 
play a far less significant role in influencing the result of that conflict. Yet twenty-
five years after that, in the epic global struggle of the Second World War, sea power 
once again claimed an indisputable “influence.” This curious and remarkable dis-
crepancy has never really been explained by naval historians. Nor is the reader 
helped very much in understanding the difference by drawing from the writings of 
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any one of the three great theorists of modern geopolitical thought concerning sea 
power and land power, Mahan, Corbett, and Mackinder, because each argued and 
composed, understandably, within the limits of his time and his perspective. Each 
had magnificent insight, yet saw but a part of the struggle for world power. Still, 
what they saw, and what they argued, helps us greatly to understand the puzzle. 
The best way of helping us comprehend the puzzle is to think about contested 
space, that is, the struggle by every large and small power to defend its own spheres 
of influence and to invade and grasp the enemy’s. In the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars the emperor not only sought to dominate his immediate con-
tinental land space but to move into Britain’s—in the Mediterranean, the Carib-
bean, Egypt, the Near East, and also in the Atlantic—through the assembling and 
deployment of large, threatening, Franco-Spanish fleets. So, from the beginning of 
the conflict until 1805, the struggle was indeed determined by vast, overpowering 
force upon the sea, that is, by large consolidated battle fleets that could drive the 
enemy’s forces away and gain control of the central commons. Great fleet fights, 
prefigured by those in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the War of the Spanish Succession, 
and the Seven Years’ War, occupied the center of the stage. From this Mahan drew 
his theory about what constituted the essence of sea power: the superior battle fleet. 
Yet strategic space was also being fought over in two other ways during the 
struggle against Napoleon, and particularly after 1805. Here of course naval war-
fare was far less glamorous—Trafalgar had been won, but Nelson was dead—yet 
other battles for strategic “space” were being fought. There were the really interest-
ing fights in the eastern seas, the struggle for the Baltic, the frigate encounters in 
the Mediterranean, and the French privateer wars against British commerce on 
the seas. The latter, being so much more of concern to Corbett, was just a part of 
the economic warfare waged during these years between Britain and Napoleonic 
France that encompassed mutual blockades, the Continental System, the use of 
credit, and the British subsidies to the land armies of its European allies.46 Just be-
cause an epic, single-day naval battle had not taken place did not mean that sea 
power after 1806 was not being exerted—and felt. 
Finally, fearing a Napoleonic domination of western and central Europe, the 
British leadership felt it had no choice but to contest the emperor’s own continental 
space, seeking to defeat him in many ways, from encouraging and funding coali-
tions of friendly land powers to pull him down from power, to the actual deploy-
ments of the British Army, in the Peninsula, in southern France, and eventually in 
Belgium. From Helsinki to Flanders and Dover, down to Lisbon and Gibraltar and 
on via Naples to the Bosporus, Britain sought to put a wrap around the emperor’s 
efforts to break out, holding on to the rimland (sic) until there was sufficient co-
alition force to win at the heartland. This was a long and frequently unsuccessful 
grand strategy which only saw its successful realization in the battles of Borodino 
 THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THREE GREAT GLOBAL WARS, 1793 –1815, 1914–1918, 1939–1945 47 46 THE HATTENDORF PRIZE LECTURES, VOLUME 1
(1812), Leipzig (1813), and Waterloo (1815)—many leagues from Mahan’s far-off 
fleets, even if sea power had decidedly affected the outcome of this long struggle. 
During the mid-eighteenth century, it is sometimes argued, Britain had been torn 
between a “maritime” and a “continental” strategy; in bringing Napoleon down, 
there was no question but that both were needed.47
One hundred years later, ideas about the importance of sea power never stood 
higher in the public realm. All the great powers before 1914 (including land -based 
ones such as Russia) strove to have as large a navy as possible, naval “races” oc-
curred between so many of these nations, and Mahan’s theories about the role of 
the battle fleet in deciding victory were dominant. What followed in 1914–18, as 
described in the section above, was therefore all the more disappointing, and yet 
this is understandable if one thinks again about contested “space.” During the war, 
sea power was seen by contemporaries to play a lesser role because the German-
led Central Powers had no real opportunity to enter the British Empire’s maritime 
space, at least not in the form of surface warfare in the Atlantic and beyond. Grand 
Mahanian battle fleets were there, all right, but they were confined by circumstance 
to remain chiefly in their North Sea harbors. In the Baltic, North Sea, and Adriatic 
waters there were some small, desultory surface actions, but really after 1916 the 
struggle for mastery at sea became much more a battle for the Atlantic sea-lanes—
Corbett’s vital maritime routes.
Since extra-European spheres could not be invaded by Berlin except by this 
challenge by the U-boat after 1916, and there already existed a gigantic struggle 
between the Austro-German and Franco-Russian empires for control of the land 
space of Europe, what took place, to the dismay of the navalists, was the dispatch 
of huge British Empire and later American armies to swing the land balances on 
the western and Italian fronts; the maritime nations were invading continental 
space, not the reverse. Significant military operations also took place in Palestine, 
Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus during 1915–19, but those were contested only by 
Germany’s lesser ally, Turkey, and thus the chief battlefronts remained in Europe, 
in France, Italy, and Poland-Ukraine. In none of those areas did sea power play 
a direct role. When the year 1918 saw each side committing all their respective 
military resources for the hoped-for victory, the Grand Fleet, to Jellicoe’s frustra-
tion, swung at anchor in Scapa Flow. Allied naval power had fairly easily preserved 
Britain’s own physical security, and then maintained command of the Atlantic sea-
lanes, but those were negative achievements, and ones out of sight, which is why 
the role of navies was much less celebrated that it had been in the triumphant years 
following 1815. 
Even so, the swift collapse of the League of Nations system, the rise of the three 
revisionist nations of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the reoccurrence of another 
furious worldwide naval arms race in the late 1930s meant that sea power’s role was 
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not doubted when the Second World War broke out. The British Admiralty had 
no other choice but to rely upon a Mahanian battle posture: off Norway, in sinking 
the Bismarck and the Scharnhorst, in protecting the Mediterranean convoys, and in 
shepherding the North African and Sicilian landings. At the same time, it had no 
other choice but to commit to a massive, unrelenting Corbettian strategy of secur-
ing the Atlantic sea-lanes. In the European-Atlantic naval battles, therefore, each 
theorist had his vindication.
Further east, the navalists’ case could be much more easily made. The Pacific 
War had been from beginning to end about winning or losing maritime mastery. 
And if one substituted carrier groups for battleship squadrons, it turned out to be 
much more of a Mahanian struggle for command of the central oceans than a Cor-
bettian fight over convoy routes and sea-lanes. It didn’t really matter, though. The 
point was that, in this war, naval power had proved to be vital for the Allied victory.
In sum, to every navalist author’s delight, the Pacific War had joined with the 
prolonged Atlantic and Mediterranean campaigns in being fought for command 
of the sea. And even if Stalinist propaganda was to attempt to ignore the fact, the 
war of the eastern front was also affected, in some part, by seaborne supplies to the 
USSR and the choking off of such supplies to Germany. Why not then agree that 
navies, and naval power, had once again counted for such a lot in world affairs? 
That seemed so obvious, when a vast Allied fleet rested in Tokyo Bay, while hun-
dreds of German U-boats were being scuttled or surrendered to their victorious 
naval opponents. The end of the First World War was signed in a railway carriage at 
Compiègne; but now, the end of the Second World War was signed on the afterdeck 
of the battleship USS Missouri. What place of signature, on each occasion, could be 
more symbolic? As was the case in 1815, but had not been the case in 1918, Nep-
tune in 1945 could again hold his trident high.
But to what end? Even then, as those victorious Allied navies rested in that bay, 
sea power’s role had not really been settled, or, rather, it was about to be unsettled. 
Over the post-1945 age there hung the immediate shadow, and the conundrum, of 
the coming of atomic weaponry. The claims of all armed services, navies included, 
were now thrown into question. This was an odd fate, and an odd ending to a naval 
historical narrative that otherwise seemed so teleological; but the fact was that the 
story of sea power’s place in the three great global wars of these 150 years simply 
did end with such a paradox. The Anglo-American navies that had fought so well, 
so impressively, so successfully, came out of this war with their futures more uncer-
tain than ever before in history.
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The U.S. Naval War College is pleased to recognize your achievements by naming you Hattendorf 
Prize laureate. This award is fully merited by your distinguished scholarly contributions to 
maritime history. You shaped the world’s understanding of German navies and traced their 
influence on professional military education and on the roles of navies and of sea power. Your 
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eight bound volumes. Your impeccable scholarship on this huge documentary source made 
your edition the single most important authoritative source for the strategic and operational 
decisions of the German Navy during the Second World War. Your innovative approach to 
naval history inspired other scholars to understand the past by first using documentary sources 
to establish “how it actually was.” In the tradition of our own Alfred Thayer Mahan and the 
U.S. Naval War College, your operational histories and strategic studies of the German Navy, 
in particular, informed contemporary practitioners’ understanding of the role of underlying 
politics and organizational group dynamics on naval affairs in both peace and war during the 
entire scope of German naval history from 1848 to the present. In addition to your published 
work in several languages, your fellow historians are most grateful for your long service to 
maritime history within the German armed forces, first as an instructor at the Naval Academy 
Mürwik; then at the German General Staff College at Hamburg; and finally at the German 
Armed Forces Military History Research Office from 1988, where you rose from head of the 
naval section to deputy director of that office, before serving as its general director in 1995–
1997, after which you retired from active service. Your long and impressive naval service 
combined with your continuing body of scholarship represents a singular contribution to the 
future of history. This award honors you and your incomparable work as a naval professional 
and as a scholarly historian, expressing appreciation for your distinguished contributions in 
framing our collective understanding of the influence of sea power upon international history.
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German Navies from 1848 to 2016
Their Development and Courses from Confrontation 
to Cooperation 
M ilitary history deals with the evolution and structure of armed forces and their position in state and society. In this sense, naval history is taken to mean that part of military history that concentrates its studies 
on the navy. However, when dealing with fields of research, one sphere provides 
the greatest challenge for military and naval historians: warfare in the widest sense.1
In his book The Face of Battle, British historian John Keegan points out that 
many historians are shy about exploring the profundities and realities of war.2 Gen-
erally speaking, we can expect naval or other military historians to have a certain 
affinity for the subject of their research. They should have a basic knowledge about 
the military, in the same way that we expect an economic historian to have a sound 
basic knowledge of economic theory. But Keegan is justified in demanding that 
the military historian spend as much time as possible among military personnel, 
“because the quite chance observation of trivial incidents may illuminate his . . . 
understanding of all sorts of problems from the past which will otherwise almost 
certainly remain obscured.”3 Like any historian, the naval historian bears a great 
responsibility in his striving after historical truth, if he wants to be taken seriously. 
The uncritical patriotic history that used to glorify naval actions should be a thing 
of the past.
Today, some historians tend to judge personalities, events, and structures ac-
cording to today’s moral categories. They end up “putting the past on trial, and 
since the critical historian, armed with his generation’s self-confidence or with his 
progressive concept of the future, knows everything better, in this trial he will be 
prosecutor, judge, and legislator all in one.”4
In 1957, the German navy began to develop a new approach to studying its 
own history. That year, the first fleet commander in chief, Rear Adm. Rolf 
Johannesson (1900–89), organized the Historical-Tactical Conference. Since then 
it has been held every year, and is now a standard element of the naval officer’s 
historical education. Johannesson’s aim was to distance his service from subjective 
naval history about World War I.5 He hoped that a critical discussion of the past 
would teach his officers truth, loyalty, and moral courage, and that they would 
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determine their own position more solidly by recourse to history and the federal 
constitution. Through 2016, fifty-six conferences have been held, covering a wide 
variety of subjects.6 Papers usually are presented by junior officers from the fleet, 
assisted by naval historians. The presentation of the papers and the candid dis-
cussion of subjects relevant to the business of the day usually provide testimony 
to the intellectual talents among the navy’s officer corps. Many an admiral-to-
be made a mark when as a lieutenant he presented some critical theory about 
history—provoking the older generation’s opposition.
It is a perennial challenge to historians even to come close to historical truth. 
The commercial success of popular publications, as well as the large number of 
visitors attracted to museums, indicates how many people have historical interests. 
Such continuing interest is a stimulating challenge for professional historians. We 
should continue to try to present our findings about background information and 
structures from the past in such a way that the message gets across—meaning that 
historical knowledge and historical sensitivity become factors serving to help sta-
bilize a liberal society.
THE BIRTH OF A GERMAN NAVY
The first German navy worthy to bear such designation was established in 1848, 
when a conflict over the duchy of Schleswig resulted in a war with Denmark.7 At 
that time, Germany could do nothing against the Danes’ efficient blockade; ocean 
trade came to a standstill. This dilemma resulted in a rather emotional movement 
that advocated building up a fleet. The issue soon captivated the members of the 
national assembly that had convened at Frankfurt’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral only a 
short time before. On June 14, 1848, by an overwhelming majority, the first Ger-
man parliament voted a large appropriation to build a fleet.8
Prince Adalbert of Prussia (1811–73), who had concerned himself with mari-
time problems rather early, played an important part in those first maritime plans. 
In May 1848, he published a memorandum on the buildup of a German fleet 
that became, so to speak, the Magna Carta of the German navy. By analyzing the 
maritime-strategic situation of Prussia and Germany and having taken into con-
sideration already the imminent technical revolution, it formed the first theoretical 
basis for a German naval concept. The memorandum included three models on 
which Germany might establish a navy: (1) providing mere coastal defense; (2) 
defending sea lines of communication (SLOCs); or (3) building up an independent 
sea power. Prince Adalbert, however, clearly emphasized that even steps leading to-
ward the buildup of an independent sea power would involve many risks, and that 
once this option had been chosen there could be no stopping halfway.9
During the preparations for the buildup of a fleet, it soon became clear that 
almost all requirements—in personnel, matériel, and organization—could not be 
met. It was, therefore, only natural to ask for foreign assistance. Arnold Duckwitz 
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(1802–81), the first German secretary of the navy, in October 1848 forwarded an 
official request to the American government for assistance in building up, with 
regard to personnel and matériel, a German fleet. In the United States, the Ger-
man liberal revolution had been observed with interest and with an open mind. 
Thus, the German requests met with a positive response within both private and 
official circles. First contacts were established by the frigate USS St. Lawrence, 
commanded by Capt. Hiram Paulding (1797–1878), which was visiting Bremer-
haven in the fall of 1848. The ship and crew were received enthusiastically 
as envoys of a hoped-for ally. The U.S. Navy immediately began personnel- 
support activities by rendering assistance with training: the frigate took aboard 
four Prussian sea cadets for practical exposure. Captain Paulding, as an adviser, 
was for weeks the center of attention during all discussions on the fleet buildup, 
which were held in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hannover. The matériel support concen-
trated on providing a modern frigate, which was equipped at the New York Naval 
Yard and transferred to Europe in the summer of 1849.10
Even though the duration and the scope of this first American military aid to 
Germany were limited, that assistance provided early evidence of an American 
policy of being ready and able to support, across the Atlantic, the principles of 
democracy and liberalism. On both sides of that ocean, common goals and mu-
tual sympathy for the liberal-democratic forces resulted in the first steps toward 
cooperation. How close these idealistic ties actually were became evident after the 
Frankfurt National Assembly failed, when high emigration rates resulted from dis-
appointed democrats finding their spiritual home in the United States. One exam-
ple was Carl Schurz (1829–1906), who later became Secretary of the Interior. Such 
a “brain drain” strengthened the hand of conservative forces in Germany—the con-
sequences of which are well known.
The German navy remained in existence even after the dream of a united Reich 
had long gone and the reality of particularism governed German politics. However, 
in 1853 the fleet was disbanded and its few ships were sold or scrapped.11 Only 
Prussia, with its relatively longer coastline, still had available a limited number of 
naval forces, proudly named the Royal Prussian Navy.
Yet the idea of the navy as an instrument of national unification stayed alive 
even after 1848. After the foundation of the Reich in 1871, the navy’s function 
as a symbol of German unity was stressed officially, in contrast to the army’s or-
ganization by individual states. The very term Imperial Navy emphasized that 
this instrument of power was subject directly to the Reich. The personnel of 
the Imperial German Navy (IGN) came from all parts of Germany, and the 
fleet became, as Tirpitz (see below) once put it, a “melting pot of teutonicism.”12 
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However, until 1897 the navy’s development was overshadowed by that of the 
army. The navy’s contributions to the wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 
1866, and France in 1870–71 seemingly were of no importance. Strategically, the 
IGN concentrated on providing a forward coastal defense.13
STRATEGIC ROOTS OF BUILDING A GERMAN BATTLE FLEET
In 1894, spurred by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), the Ger-
man naval high command prepared a strategic concept for the buildup of a 
battle fleet.14 Capt. Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), then chief of staff of the na-
val high command, seems to have taken the initiative to formulate the famous 
Dienstschrift (Service Memorandum) No. IX, under the misleading title “General 
Lessons Learned from the Fleet Autumn Exercise.”15
In this memorandum, Tirpitz resolutely pleads that strategic offensive actions 
should be considered “normal tasks of a fleet.”16 Such actions should aim at bring-
ing about “the earliest possible initiation of a battle,” a battle that would reach the 
“main decision” of naval warfare. That decision could not be reached by a cruis-
er war, such as was prescribed under the tenets of the French Jeune École school 
of thought, but “only by permanent naval supremacy and lasting pressure on the 
enemy.”17
Owing to Germany’s position in the heart of Central Europe, its long coasts on 
the North and Baltic Seas, and its borders with eight neighboring nations, any strat-
egy of the Reich that did not rely on strong alliance partners required it to decide 
whether a threat should be neutralized defensively or eliminated offensively. As 
long as Germany considered only France as a potential enemy (and later Russia as 
well), the offensive strategic concept for naval operations that Tirpitz laid down in 
Service Memorandum No. IX seemed appropriate.
In June 1897, Tirpitz was appointed state secretary in the Reichsmarineamt (Im-
perial Naval Office).18 Not least because of his influence, the politics of the Reich 
gradually expanded to consider the risks involved in confronting Britain. For Tir-
pitz, England was, from the beginning, “the most dangerous naval enemy,” against 
which Germany “most urgently required a certain measure of naval force as a po-
litical power factor.” Since Tirpitz considered cruiser warfare a lost cause, owing to 
Germany’s lack of naval bases, he asked for the buildup of a fleet that “can unfold its 
greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames.”19
Elsewhere within the IGN there were well-founded doubts regarding this con-
ceptualization. Capt. Curt Freiherr von Maltzahn (1849–1930), who at that time 
taught tactics and naval history at the German naval academy, warned as early as 
1898 that reaching “Seeherrschaft” (sea control) by means of a battle would not suf-
fice by itself to impose peace on the opponent, for such sea control would have to 
be maintained and exploited. This would require a surplus of strength. As long as 
neither party achieved sea control, the weaker party would be confined to fighting 
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against the achievement of sea control by its enemy, forgoing victory as the goal 
of its own combat actions. It would be important to maintain a national seaborne 
trade “corresponding in strength to the means deployed for defense.”20 Maltzahn 
considered a combination of squadron operations and cruiser war to be the most 
suitable naval strategy. “Squadron operations are indispensable in this type of war-
fare, but they are only a means and not an end, and they become only really valu-
able if the freedom of action thus gained is exploited.”21
However, such a foresighted and realistic alternative, one that combined a bal-
anced defensive fleet with strong cruiser elements, stood no chance in the IGN. 
Tirpitz repressed any further strategic discussions so as not to jeopardize the build-
up of the fleet, which had received legislative backing and thereafter was scheduled 
to be accomplished over an extended period.22
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: THE NAVAL ARMAMENT RACE
The objectives and planning principles of the German battle fleet construction 
can be summarized as follows: The basic prerequisite for gaining sea control was 
the destruction, or at least the decisive weakening, of the enemy battle fleet. Thus, 
planning focused on the fleet’s capability to impose a decision in battle. The battle 
fleet also was considered a political means of power that could enable Germany to 
defend its overseas interests adequately. Britain, the most dangerous potential op-
ponent, was to be deterred from a war with Germany by means of a strong fleet, or, 
should deterrence fail, was to be engaged successfully.
Among the liberal bourgeoisie, the naval policy met with strong support, which 
was increased even further by propaganda skillfully directed. However, while 
drawing up its ambitious armament program, Germany misjudged the dangers 
arising from its geographical situation in Central Europe. Any German approach 
that strove to establish an international maritime stature and adopt a counterpoint 
stance toward Britain was bound to be met with profound suspicion from Brit-
ain. After the German-British alliance talks in 1901 failed to produce any tangible 
results—the two sides were pursuing incompatible objectives—the buildup of the 
German battle fleet became and remained a crucial disruptive factor, preventing 
any subsequent arrangement with Britain and resulting in an arms race.
From 1905 onward, that escalatory dynamic was characterized by an enormous 
increase in the combat power of battleships. With the construction of HMS Dread-
nought in 1905–1906, the Royal Navy set a new standard. Tirpitz had to keep pace 
if the IGN was to remain equal, ship for ship, with its potential enemy. As a result, 
his long-term financial planning had been in vain, for the construction of capital 
ships involved ever-increasing costs.
Britain could cope with the cost increases involved in the construction of capital 
ships, or at least it had to do so since its security was exclusively dependent on the 
superiority of the Royal Navy. In contrast, the defense of Germany was primarily 
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an army responsibility, with the navy playing a secondary role. Britain’s first lord 
of the Admiralty Winston Churchill (1874–1965) explained this in a public speech 
in February 1912. The strategic situations of both countries, Churchill pointed out, 
made his own fleet a vital necessity to the British Empire, whereas “from some 
points of view, the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury.”23
Groaning under the burden of high naval expenditures, in 1912 both govern-
ments tried again to come to an agreement that they hoped would reduce the build-
ing rates of capital ships. In February 1912, the British cabinet sent Secretary of 
State for War Richard B. Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane (1856–1928), to Berlin to 
try to reach a general settlement in these matters. However, Lord Haldane’s talks 
with the German side never converted into real negotiations, and the effort failed 
after a few days. The British were unwilling “to commit themselves to neutrality,” 
and the German side—under pressure from Tirpitz—was unwilling to modify the 
country’s planned building rate.24 Tirpitz appreciated that for England “the Entente 
with France gives her the best security against a too powerful Germany,” he said. 
“I no longer believe that we can get out of this vicious circle.”25 As Germany did 
not have enough resources to fulfill all the requirements of both the army and the 
navy, the IGN could not keep up in the unconstrained arms race that commenced 
thereafter, even though by 1914 it had become the world’s second-strongest navy.
Before 1914, modern warships, such as capital ships, cruisers, and torpedo 
boats, were not only part of a nation’s military potential but striking evidence of 
its industrial and technological capability. Only highly industrialized nations could 
solve on their own the complex technological problems that the transition to mod-
ern capital ships involved. This was particularly true for the new technologies of 
engines and weapons, as well as for the improvement in ship survivability achieved 
through the use of high-quality steel armor.26
The period between 1905 and 1914 was characterized by a technological revo-
lution that made naval weapons obsolete rapidly. This applied to cruisers, torpedo 
boats, and submarines as well as larger units. During the first major naval battles 
of World War I, the decisive effects of superior speed and more-powerful guns 
became apparent.
STRATEGY AND GEOGRAPHY
Tirpitz based his strategic concept on the assumption that the Royal Navy al-
ways would act offensively in a war against Germany; in particular, it would es-
tablish a close blockade of the German coast. Such a blockade near Heligoland 
“would provide abundant opportunities to equalize naval strength” or to “enter 
into a decisive battle.”27 For the IGN, this hypothetical battle became an element of 
dogma—the focal point of its operational concept and fleet training. For this rea-
son, knowledge of and experience with weapons technology, tactics, and shiphan-
dling were more-decisive factors in the careers of naval officers than qualification 
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in staff assignments—which had a long-term effect on the choice of personnel for 
command-and-control appointments. The work of the Admiralstab (naval staff), 
established in 1899, and the creation of a specialized corps of staff officers to man 
it, seemed secondary in importance. As a consequence, the naval officer corps re-
mained unprepared for the complex strategic dimensions of a naval war against 
Britain.28
Although all the preparations focused on the “decisive battle,” a great deal of 
confusion existed regarding the true purpose of the battle.29 While those staffing 
the German naval command had adopted Mahan’s theory of sea power willingly, 
they paid only lip service to a central element of that theory: the importance of 
geographical position and the resultant strategic options. By throttling Germany’s 
seaborne trade, an opponent could decide a “war by severing an artery essential to 
the existence of Germany.”30
An incorrect assessment of the effects of geography on British naval operations 
led the German naval leadership to a faulty assessment of British strategy. Britain 
had never attempted to eliminate an opponent’s navy at any price; it did so only 
when the British Isles and their SLOCs in the Atlantic were threatened. And these 
SLOCs remained outside the range of the German naval forces, except for a few 
cruisers and, later, submarines. To maintain a close blockade of the German coast, 
the Royal Navy would have found it useful to eliminate the German fleet at an 
early date, but the Admiralty was well aware that such a strategic offensive would 
involve considerable losses. Especially cognizant of the threat that German torpedo 
boats, submarines, and mines represented, after 1911–12 the Royal Navy no longer 
considered deploying its Grand Fleet to the southern North Sea.31 In November 
1912, the Admiralty issued a set of “General Instructions” to its war plans against 
Germany, summarizing Britain’s strategic approach as follows:
The general idea is to use our geographical advantage of position to cut off all German ship-
ping from oceanic trade and to secure the British coasts from any serious military enterprise 
and incidentally but effectually to cover the transport across the Channel of an Expedition-
ary Force to France. . . . It is believed that the prolongation of a distant blockade will inflict 
injury upon German interests. . . . To relieve such a situation, Germany would be tempted 
to send into the North Sea a force sufficient . . . to offer a general action. Such an action or 
actions would take place far from the German coast and close to our own.32
This plan implied a new wartime deployment for the Grand Fleet: basing it at Scapa 
Flow, in the Scottish Orkneys.
When in 1912 the German naval staff discovered the new orientation of its po-
tential enemy, the chief of naval staff, Vice Adm. August von Heeringen (1855–
1927), examined in a war game whether and how Germany’s High Seas Fleet 
could counter a distant blockade. The result was sobering. The Blue (i.e., German) 
wargaming party had advanced its squadrons as far as the Firth of Forth, but there 
they encountered difficulties and suffered considerable losses while withdrawing. 
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The admiral concluded: “If the British really restrict their activities to the remote 
blockade and consistently hold back their battle fleet, then the role of our beautiful 
High Seas Fleet could be a very sad one in wartime. The submarines will have to 
do the job.”33
It must be left open what type of submarine employment Heeringen had in 
mind, but his estimate hit the central strategic problem for German naval warfare 
during World War I. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, the role of the submarine as a naval weapon “had grown from base to coast 
defence and from this to an offensive task in enemy waters.”34 Basically, the sub-
marine was a mobile torpedo boat with long endurance. Submerged, a submarine 
made only slow progress—but it had the ability to vanish below the surface of the 
sea for several hours.
In comparison with other naval powers, the IGN came late to building subma-
rines. The first one, U-1 (282 tons), was commissioned in December 1906. Obvi-
ously, Tirpitz had waited until he was sure that submarines were an effective of-
fensive weapon. After 1908, he ordered more than forty oceangoing submarines, of 
which twenty-eight had been completed before war broke out.35
WORLD WAR I
When Britain joined the war on the side of France and Russia in August 1914, it 
became clear that the German High Seas Fleet could not perform its political func-
tion of deterrence. Britain, relying on its superior fleet and the strategic positions 
the country and its empire held worldwide to protect its vital SLOCs, considered 
the German fleet, which could operate only from the North Sea, to be an accept-
able risk.36
In August 1914, the IGN lay under the spell of great enemy superiority. The na-
val command placed all its hopes on reducing enemy forces through offensive sub-
marine and minelaying operations. The assumption was that the opponent would 
seek battle, but Germany’s fleet was to be employed in such a battle only “under 
favorable conditions.”37
Although the few German cruisers stationed overseas at the outbreak of war 
were quite successful in guerre de course (warfare against merchant vessels), the 
Royal Navy soon neutralized them. Germany’s East Asiatic Squadron, under Vice 
Adm. Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) moved across the Pacific Ocean and de-
stroyed a British squadron off Chile, but its advance to the Falkland Islands in the 
South Atlantic on December 8, 1914, proved fatal.38 The example demonstrates that 
the IGN neither recognized nor made use of the strategic advantages it might have 
derived from coordinating the operations of its naval forces overseas with those at 
home.
However, one small but powerful German squadron did influence the bal-
ance of forces and the overall course of World War I: the Mediterranean Division, 
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comprising the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, under Rear Adm.
Wilhelm A. Souchon (1864–1946). The breakthrough of the two units to Constan-
tinople and their formal handover to Turkey in August 1914 influenced Turkey to 
join the war on the side of the Central powers in October 1914. The Turkish straits 
(the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) became impassable for the Allies; all their at-
tempts to penetrate them failed, with heavy losses.39 Thus, the second important 
route to Russia, other than the Baltic Sea, remained blocked, contributing to Rus-
sia’s loss as an ally of the Entente in 1917. After the war, Sir Julian S. Corbett com-
mented as follows on this German strategic success:
When we consider that the Dardanelles was mined, that no permission to enter it had been 
ratified, and that everything depended on the German powers of cajolery at Constantinople, 
when we also recall the world wide results that ensued, it is not too much to say that few 
naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken. So completely, indeed, did the 
risky venture turn a desperate situation into one of high moral and material advantage, that 
for the credit of German statesmanship it goes far to balance the cardinal blunder of attack-
ing France through Belgium.40
The various operations the High Seas Fleet conducted in the North and Baltic 
Seas, which culminated in the battle of Jutland in May 1916, cannot conceal the 
fact that primarily it performed the functions of a “fleet in being”: securing the 
German coast, blocking the Baltic approaches, and keeping clear the submarines’ 
sailing routes.41
In the first few months of the war, the submarine gave a striking demonstration 
of its power. On September 22, 1914, U-9 (Lt. Otto Weddigen [1880–1915], com-
manding) sank three aged armored cruisers in an hour. At first, the Royal Navy 
could not believe the cruisers “had been attacked by a single submarine and attrib-
uted the disaster to a whole flotilla.”42 Over the next couple of weeks, the U-boats 
extended their patrols; by October 1914, U-20 had penetrated the Channel to attack 
transports on their way to France, circumnavigated the British Isles, and returned 
to Germany, having cruised 2,200 miles in eighteen days.43
Commerce Raiding by U-boats, 1915–18
The varied arguments concerning the degree of success German submarines 
achieved in their raiding against Britain’s maritime commerce are a classic example 
of the civil-military struggle of a nation at war. At the time, this struggle was influ-
enced greatly by public opinion, for submarine warfare became a popular myth to 
which a large number of Germans subscribed; they believed the U-boat was some 
sort of infallible, magic weapon that would bring victory. Because of some success-
ful surprise raids, not only the public but the naval command overestimated the 
efficiency of submarines.
Initial considerations within the IGN regarding the employment of subma-
rines against British shipping had not yielded a clear picture by the time Tirpitz 
spoke publicly on the issue—which he did without consulting Chancellor Theobald 
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von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921) or chief of naval staff Adm. Hugo von Pohl 
(1855–1916). In response to the British threat to “strangulate the [German] econo-
my with the help of a blockade,” as Churchill had put it in a speech on November 9, 
Tirpitz responded in an interview that Germany could “play the same game”—by 
torpedoing all British shipping.44
This triggered a passionate public debate that had repercussions for the naval 
command. The young historian Gerhard Ritter (1888–1967) knew from his own 
experience during the war that
[i]t was Tirpitz’s interview that poured more oil on the fire when it was published in late 
December. Thenceforth the question of submarine warfare was no longer a naval problem 
for the experts to judge, but a political issue of the first order, with everyone having his say. 
A “U-boat movement” quickly came into being. . . . Again the academic superpatriots were 
in the forefront with plans and petitions to the Chancellor and the navy on how to starve 
Britain into submission. Some of the most renowned names at the University of Berlin were 
among them.45
The naval staff encouraged support for commerce warfare from the govern-
ment; however, the method’s prospects for success could not be assessed, because 
so few submarines were available. Of the twenty-two submarines in the North Sea 
in early 1915, only fourteen (those with diesel engines) could operate west of the 
British Isles. The chancellor came under both public and naval pressure while mak-
ing his decision, and he relied too much on the navy staff ’s optimistic forecast. 
Early in February 1915, Bethmann-Hollweg gave his consent to submarine war-
fare—without either the government or the naval command having analyzed thor-
oughly the methodology of commerce raiding itself or the associated political risks 
and international complications.
The German proclamation of February 4, 1915, declared “the waters around 
Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, to be a war 
zone in which every merchant ship encountered would be destroyed, without it 
always being possible to assure the safety of passengers and crew. Because of the 
British misuse of neutral flags, it might not always be possible to prevent attacks 
meant for hostile ships from falling on neutrals.”46 By conducting commerce war-
fare in this way, Germany opened new issues in international law, because subma-
rines could not adhere adequately to the classic prize rules. This was particularly so 
after the British began arming merchant vessels, and later created disguised British 
auxiliary cruisers (Q-ships), which were a great threat to U-boats.
Despite these challenges, the commanding officers of German submarines, dis-
playing a combination of caution and skill, achieved remarkable results with their 
deck guns while managing to comply with the prize regulations. Owing to a lack 
of space, submarines could not embark survivors, but in many cases they towed 
lifeboats to nearby coasts. However, the German naval staff criticized this practice: 
“The deterring effect of the submarine war will be lost if it is felt that passing the 
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blockade zone is no longer a serious risk to the lives of the crews.”47 Without provid-
ing its submarine commanding officers with clear instructions, the naval command 
obviously assumed that most ships would be sunk by torpedoes without warning, 
further deterring neutral shipping.
When the U.S. government raised concerns about the way the war was being 
waged and referred to the international principles of naval warfare, the chief of the 
general staff, Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), feared the United States 
might enter the war. He wanted a guarantee that submarine warfare would force 
England “to give in” within six weeks. When the kaiser inquired about the matter, 
Tirpitz and the new chief of naval staff, Vice Adm. Gustav Bachmann (1860–1943), 
confirmed this amazing forecast—without explaining what they meant by England’s 
“giving in.” On February 12, Bachmann wrote to Admiral Pohl, then commander in 
chief of the High Seas Fleet: “It is in the military interest to make submarine war-
fare as effective as possible. Do not shy away from sinking enemy passenger liners. 
Their loss will cause the greatest impact.”48
The first serious instances of confrontation with the United States arose from 
German naval activities. On May 7, 1915, the submarine U-20 sank the British 
passenger liner Lusitania (31,550 gross registered tons [GRT]), using only one tor-
pedo. This attack was conducted without warning and claimed the lives of 1,198 
civilians, including 126 Americans; however, it was established later that Lusitania 
had been carrying some war matériel in its forecastle.
This incident caused a severe diplomatic rift with the United States. President 
Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) called on Germany to adhere to the accepted prin-
ciples of naval warfare and to respect the safety of American citizens traveling in 
the war zone. Following a similar incident in August 1915, the German govern-
ment yielded. In September, over the objection of the naval command, commerce 
raiding was ordered stopped west of the British Isles; only in the North and Medi-
terranean Seas was commerce raiding continued, and then in accordance with the 
prize regulations.
By early 1916, the number of operational U-boats had risen to fifty-one. Inten-
sified submarine warfare, as demanded by the chief of general staff, resumed in 
February 1916. It aimed at sinking armed British merchant vessels, without warn-
ing, while sparing passenger liners. But the French Channel steamer Sussex was 
torpedoed on March 24, 1916, and another severe crisis between Germany and the 
United States ensued. On April 18, 1916, Washington threatened to sever diplo-
matic relations.49
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg now saw his earlier pessimistic assessment of 
the situation confirmed. From the onset of the new stage of submarine warfare, he 
had doubted the need for such a hazardous venture, “which would claim as a stake 
our existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety, while the 
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chance of winning, that is, the prospect of bringing England down by fall, is a rather 
uncertain one.”50
So the chancellor provided assurance to Washington that merchant vessels 
“would not be sunk without warning or without saving people’s lives.”51 As a result, 
the frontline commanders of the IGN (i.e., of the High Seas Fleet and the German 
marine corps in Flanders), acting on their own initiative—later backed up by the 
naval command—moved their submarines out of the western operating areas be-
cause they felt that operating under prize regulations exposed their vessels to great 
danger. Commerce raiding under the prize regulations was continued only in the 
Mediterranean. In the North Sea, the submarines operated against military targets 
until September 1916, without achieving any significant results.
This extreme reaction—transferring submarines out of the operating areas 
entirely—was inconsistent with the actual situation. Of the thirty-five submarines 
that had been lost by June 1916, only four had been destroyed by Q-ships, and none 
had been destroyed by armed merchant vessels.
Submarines’ promising capabilities for commerce raiding, even under the prize 
regulations, became more discernible in summer 1916.52 The resumption of subma-
rine warfare under the prize regulations provoked no political risks while achieving 
considerable results: the monthly average of sinkings between October 1916 and 
January 1917 was 189 merchant vessels, of 324,742 GRT. This was not enough to 
force a decision in the war against Britain, but the war economy of the Allies was 
damaged heavily enough to produce a chance for a negotiated peace. Still, the naval 
command, in a rigid and dogmatic manner, repeatedly demanded “unrestricted 
submarine warfare.” The IGN was convinced that this would result in decisive vic-
tory, even presuming the expected break with the United States.
The naval staff decided to test the U.S. government by sending a submarine to 
the U.S. East Coast. On October 7, 1916, thirty-one-year-old Lt. Hans Rose (1885–
1969), endowed with powers equivalent to those of an ancient Roman proconsul 
(his wording), headed his submarine, U-53, for Newport, Rhode Island, as a dem-
onstration of the efficiency of German submarines—and as a warning to the U.S. 
Navy. After a three-hour visit to the Naval War College, Rose departed Newport—
and sank five enemy merchant ships off the American coast, under prize rules. 
Sixteen U.S. destroyers observed this action at close range.53
The atmosphere and attitude among German naval officers at that time were 
portrayed in a diary entry by Lt. Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882–1951) of September 
27, 1916. “The naval officers are sitting around, drinking, talking politics, hatching 
plots, and into the bargain feel patriotic, trying, in a dishonest way, to force subma-
rine warfare. Submarine warfare is designed to conceal the foolish things done in 
developing the fleet and employing the fleet in war. This inadmissible propaganda 
evidences their bad consciences.”54
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However, the propaganda Weizsäcker mentioned was effective. This was espe-
cially significant since the new general headquarters of all army forces, under Field 
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and Gen. Erich Ludendorff (1865–
1937), realized that the attrition campaign had failed and that, as things stood, 
victory in France was becoming less and less likely.
Unlike the military, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg intended to avoid U.S. en-
try into the war on the Allied side. He hoped that President Wilson would arrange a 
negotiated peace. However, when the British government in December 1916 harsh-
ly rejected a German peace offer, German leaders changed their opinion. Now the 
military leaders, especially Hindenburg and Ludendorff, categorically demanded 
“unrestricted submarine warfare,” claiming it was the last means of gaining victory. 
At a conference on January 9, 1917, after heated discussion, the chancellor support-
ed their demand, and the German high command recommenced unrestricted sub-
marine warfare on February 1, 1917.55 A few weeks later, at a meeting of the Main 
Parliament Committee, Adm. Eduard von Capelle (1855–1931), Tirpitz’s successor, 
“went so far as to insist that the effect of American entry into war would be ‘zero’! 
American troops would not even be able to cross the ocean for lack of transport.”56
In response to unrestricted warfare, the United States broke relations with Ger-
many, announcing “armed neutrality.” However, the Entente wanted the United 
States to enter the war, so the alliance could take utmost advantage of a fully mo-
bilized American war economy. Thanks to maladroit German diplomacy, this goal 
soon was accomplished.
Seeking to keep the Americans militarily engaged on their continent and in 
the Pacific Ocean, Germany proposed an alliance with Japan and Mexico. The 
proposal was sent by cable to Mexico in the so-called Zimmermann telegram 
on January 16, 1917. With the aid of captured German codebooks, British naval 
intelligence managed to decrypt all the German diplomatic cables transmitted 
among Berlin, Washington, and Mexico City. To expedite the U.S. decision-making 
process, the British government transmitted the pertinent cables to Washington, 
and President Wilson had them released to the press on February 28.57
Germany’s offer to Mexico of an alliance inflamed American public opinion 
against Germany. Early in April, the United States entered the war on the side of 
the Allies. Thus, unrestricted submarine warfare alone did not trigger the Ameri-
can declaration of war, but Germany’s naval stance contributed to it in a substantial 
way.
On February 1, 1917, Germany had 105 operational submarines available to 
conduct unrestricted submarine warfare. By June 1917, their number had been in-
creased to only 129. Because of the increase in operations between February and 
July 1917, repair periods gradually were prolonged, leading to a decrease in the 
number of operationally ready submarines.58
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On the other hand, in April 1917 alone, 458 Allied ships totaling 840,000 GRT 
were sunk. This led to a severe crisis for the Allies, who momentarily doubted their 
ability to continue the war. However, Germany did not achieve its strategic objec-
tive—effective disruption of British shipping. The Allies introduced convoying in 
the summer of 1917, and thereafter far fewer ships were sunk. Between Febru-
ary and June 1917, an average of 363 ships of 629,863 GRT were sunk per month, 
whereas during the last quarter of 1917 sinkings averaged 159 per month, totaling 
365,489 GRT. In 1918, the numbers of ships sunk decreased even further. Because 
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of this, the German naval staff was not able to keep the promise it had made: by the 
autumn of 1918, about 1.4 million American soldiers had made it to France. U.S. 
entry into the war proved to be the decisive factor in the defeat of Germany.59
After the Allies introduced the convoy system, German submarines faced seri-
ous operational and tactical problems. The concentration of merchant ships in a 
convoy had to be countered with a concentration of submarines. Even before that, 
reconnaissance was required—the convoys had to be detected. The few boats avail-
able west of the British Isles could not cover the entire operating area, allowing 
many convoys to reach Britain undetected. When a submarine sighted a convoy, 
it could conduct a submerged attack, with torpedoes. The gun armament, which 
until the institution of convoying had achieved most results, fell into disuse.
Along with introducing the convoy system, the Allies enhanced antisubmarine 
defense by developing more efficient depth charges and the first underwater locat-
ing devices. But above all, it was the intensive mining of the shipping lanes in the 
North Sea and the English Channel that caused most U-boat casualties. Of the 132 
German submarines lost in 1917–18, at least fifty sank after hitting mines.60
At the end of September 1918, the army’s supreme command admitted military 
defeat and demanded an immediate armistice. The United States made termina-
tion of unrestricted submarine warfare a precondition for reestablishing diplo-
matic contact. Yet the German naval command—to justify its existence—prepared 
to send the fleet out for one final battle. The ships’ companies discerned that the 
naval command was acting arbitrarily and refused to obey. Within a few days, this 
mutiny developed into a revolt that led to the collapse and end of the IGN, which 
accelerated a general uprising in Germany.61
The Lessons of the Great War
In spite of outstanding achievements and successes against a superior opponent 
in various war theaters, the outcome of German naval operations was negative at 
the end of World War I. Not only did the IGN’s strategic concepts for fleet em-
ployment and for commerce warfare using submarines fail, but those failures were 
the starting point for a revolt that triggered the political overthrow of the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the High Seas Fleet effectively operated as a fleet in being. Its 
presence pinned down the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, including lighter 
naval forces, which consequently were not available for convoy-escort duty in the 
Atlantic. The fleet protected the German coast, blocked the Baltic against Allied re-
supply shipments to Russia, and, to a certain extent, backed up submarine warfare 
by keeping the departure and return routes clear. Contrary to the current view of 
historians who entirely deny the fleet’s strategic importance, the fleet was an asset 
for the German war effort; but a realistic cost-benefit analysis shows that, in the 
end, the fleet did not achieve what it was expected to.
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One of the fundamental lessons learned during World War I was that, over the 
long run, an effective blockade could so weaken the German war potential and 
economy, which were greatly dependent on the importation of raw materials, that 
not even defensive operations could be conducted. The German naval command 
had not realized that sea power, i.e., the ability to control and successfully use the 
sea, essentially is the product of both fleet strength and geographical position. If 
either factor were deficient, the entire result suffered. This was one of the essential 
reasons the High Seas Fleet did not bring about a decision in the overall conduct of 
the war. It failed to develop a concept in which the two components of naval war-
fare—surface forces and submarines—were integrated to enable timely and effective 
deployment against the two key strategic weak points in the enemy alliance: Allied 
merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Russian coastline in the Baltic.
During the submarine war against Allied merchant shipping, the naval com-
mand rigidly relied on a one-sided and, in the end, inadequate naval concept that 
ignored the possibility and reality of U.S. entry into the war, thereby contributing 
to Germany’s defeat. During the operations against Russia, Germany hardly ever 
exploited its naval superiority. However, Germany’s blocking of access to the Bal-
tic, in parallel with its ally’s control of the Turkish straits, diminished Russia’s war 
potential considerably. This success in the economic war, which Germany had not 
foreseen, relieved the country of the necessity to prosecute the war on two fronts 
by the spring of 1918; but that was too late to bring about success for the overall 
war effort.
The result Germany experienced in World War I was due not only to insuf-
ficient concepts and means but to the naval command’s strategic incompetence. 
The leadership seemed to be incapable of recognizing the natural limits that 
existed—limits that would have to be imposed on any German naval strategy with-
in the overall strategic concept.
THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1919–39
The Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of a third-rate naval power.62 
Submarines and military aircraft were forbidden to it altogether. As a result, the 
navy lacked the weapons that modern naval warfare required. However, French 
opposition thwarted the British attempt to abolish the submarine entirely; Paris 
became the champion of minor naval powers by emphasizing the importance of the 
submarine as a naval weapon for weaker nations.63 During the preparation of the 
peace treaty, Adm. William S. Benson (1855–1932), the American Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), advocated only moderate cuts in the strength of the future Ger-
man navy so as to maintain a counterbalance to the British fleet in the North Sea.64 
The British never considered taking over the German ships for their own fleet—
too costly; they simply wanted to sink them. However, France and Italy dismissed 
this idea. The problem was solved when the Germans themselves sank the major 
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part of their fleet at Scapa Flow on June 21, 1919.65 The German naval command 
regarded this accomplishment primarily as a moral success. The consequences of 
the scuttling were severe: the Allies demanded full compensation, and claimed 80 
percent of all German port equipment; and the navy had to surrender its last five 
modern light cruisers.
German naval forces came to seem superfluous, given the total military defeat 
of 1918, the domestic unrest of 1919, and the ongoing border conflicts with Po-
land. However, for the navy to continue in existence and preserve its independence 
from the army, the service required a plausible long-run mission. When, during 
the peace negotiations in the spring of 1919, the German government offered to 
renounce its force of six old battleships so as to achieve concessions in other areas, 
the victorious powers refused, pointing out that Germany should retain some lim-
ited naval forces for its own protection. They projected a small German fleet as a 
stabilizing factor in the Baltic area. Thus, Germany’s former enemies contributed 
considerably to the continued existence—modest as it was—of the German navy.66
The naval command argued that a navy was necessary because of the territorial 
changes in eastern Europe, referring primarily to the alterations to Poland’s borders 
and the resultant isolation of East Prussia. In 1919–21, a Polish-Russian border 
dispute led to war, and future border conflicts could not be ruled out.67 If Germany 
had no naval forces at all, it would be impossible to defend East Prussia; the Poles 
would be able to cut the sea route across the Baltic—the only reliable line of supply 
for the German enclave.
The navy’s deliberations, unlike those of the army, soon expanded to consider 
other possible conflicts. As early as 1922 they took into account Poland’s ties with 
France. Once again, German naval strategy focused its attention on the North Sea. 
Given the German economy’s great dependence on seaborne supplies, the prereq-
uisites for conducting defensive operations could be achieved only if German ship-
ping in the North and Baltic Seas continued unhindered.
The navy considered itself to be an instrument of territorial defense against 
France and Poland, while hoping, in better times to come, for an end to armament 
restrictions. When it became apparent that the limitations on their own arms that 
the victorious powers had announced at Versailles were not going to materialize, 
the German government consistently aspired to equal rights and national sover-
eignty in the military sphere, such that it could develop the country’s armed forces 
into an effective instrument of national defense.
In terms of matériel, a new start gradually was made, by constructing some 
torpedo boats and light cruisers. However, the challenge of developing a ten- 
thousand-ton armored vessel (permitted by the peace treaty) that had sufficient 
combat power to survive an engagement with French capital ships was a tough nut 
to crack. Given the displacement limitation, it was not possible to meet normal 
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requirements for armament and armor plating. When the changes in the armament 
limitations for which the naval command had hoped failed to materialize, the navy 
was forced to concentrate on designing a ship that was more like a cruiser than a 
battleship.
The decisive elements that influenced this change in planning lay on 
two levels, the tactical-operational and the political-military. In the tactical- 
operational sphere, exercises showed that heavy naval forces needed more speed. In 
the political-military sphere, the naval command thought it imperative that every 
German ship constructed be superior in at least one respect to the warship catego-
ries defined in the Washington Naval Agreement (encompassing multiple treaties) 
of 1922. For battleships, it sought speed; for cruisers, heavy guns. To replace the 
old battleships while remaining under the terms of the peace treaty, the naval com-
mand planned a ship carrying six twenty-eight-centimeter (cm) guns and capable 
of twenty-eight knots.
To understand the German line of reasoning, it is necessary to look at the status 
of international naval armaments at the end of the 1920s. The countries that had 
signed the Washington Naval Treaty (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United 
States) had navies dominated by capital ships having eight to twelve heavy guns 
(with calibers between 30.5 and 40.6 cm) and speeds of twenty to twenty-three 
knots. Only Britain and Japan had battle cruisers equipped with six to eight heavy 
guns. These had a top speed between twenty-seven and thirty-one knots. Until 
1930, the Washington Naval Treaty limited the total tonnage and construction of 
battleships and aircraft carriers. For cruisers, the treaty established ceilings only for 
the displacement and armament of individual vessels. Thus, cruisers with a stan-
dard displacement of ten thousand tons and light armor were built. Their main 
armament comprised six to ten 20.3 cm guns; they had a top speed of thirty-three 
knots. Although they could evade the slower capital ships, they had to avoid con-
tact with battle cruisers, which were capable of similar speed yet far superior in 
armament.
Since the core of the French fleet consisted of nine slow capital ships and five 
fast heavy cruisers, the German naval command deliberately endowed its ten- 
thousand-ton vessel with the characteristics of a “small battle-cruiser”: it was supe-
rior to cruisers in armament and to capital ships in speed. With six 28 cm guns in 
two triple turrets and a speed of twenty-six to twenty-eight knots, the Panzerschiff 
(armored ship, also known as a “pocket battleship”) came very close to the con-
cept of the battle cruiser. Moreover, diesel engines would give the ship a maximum 
range of twenty thousand miles, vastly exceeding that of any cruiser or capital ship. 
Owing to its combat effectiveness and endurance, the pocket battleship was suit-
able for both warfare in the North Sea and offensive operations in the Atlantic.
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The construction of the ship immediately attracted the attention of foreign na-
val experts. In April 1929, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold 
(1869–1941), reported to his government as follows:
From a naval technical point of view, the building of this vessel is to be welcomed, as its de-
sign promises to include a number of new features in warship construction. The principal of 
these are reported to be a comparatively heavy armament of six 11-inch guns, eight 5.8-inch 
and twenty antiaircraft guns, six torpedo tubes, adequate armour protection, special Diesel 
engines giving a cruising speed of 26 knots, the extensive employment of light metals and 
electric welding in place of riveting, and the highest degree of unsinkability.68
However, Germany’s naval command regarded the construction of pocket bat-
tleships not just as a military necessity but as a political-military lever with which 
to upset the entire system of international naval armament controls that had been 
established—without German participation—at Washington in 1922. The naval 
command hoped this step would give Germany the chance to be readmitted to the 
community of major naval powers.69 Of course, if Germany had been included in 
the Washington Naval Agreement, this would have been tantamount to a wholesale 
abrogation of the naval arms limitations laid down in the Treaty of Versailles.
Change of Strategy and Operational Planning
The naval command was cognizant that Germany was highly dependent on sea-
borne imports. It tried to impress this overall strategic reality on the army so the 
latter would take that factor into account when drawing up its operational plans. 
From 1928 onward, the new minister of the Reichswehr (German Imperial De-
fense), Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Groener (Ret.) (1867–1939), set new standards for all 
operational planning by the army and navy. He stressed that the idea of a large-
scale war had to be ruled out from the start. Military operations against foreign 
powers should be limited to two possible types of conflict: (1) repelling raids from 
neighboring states onto German territory; (2) maintaining armed neutrality during 
a conflict between foreign powers.
Groener demanded that the Reichswehr be combat ready to oppose immedi-
ately any sudden Polish invasion. For the navy, this new concept meant it had to be 
able, on seventy-two hours’ notice, to begin operations to destroy the Polish navy 
and neutralize the port of Gdynia as a naval base.70 Such a demonstrative strike 
clearly was intended to be part of a strategy of deterrence. Under this concept of 
calculated escalation, the German government could react quickly to a possible 
invasion, then refer the conflict to the League of Nations without delay. Thus, the 
government gave the navy, for the first time, a role as an effective instrument of 
crisis management.
In the spring of 1929, Groener requested that the naval command review 
whether Germany, to conduct its maritime defense, would need any surface units 
that went beyond the ceiling of the peace treaty. By so inquiring, Groener got at 
the heart of the self-perception of the navy’s leadership, which saw its service not 
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merely as an instrument of national defense but, in the long run, as an indispens-
able prerequisite for a future German maritime position of power. Under no cir-
cumstances would a return to brown-water-navy status be acceptable; the German 
navy instead intended to build oceangoing units, in accordance with the traditional 
concept of naval prestige, and thereby to express hope for a better future. Naturally, 
it was not possible, nor was it intended, to explain this to a minister who, although 
he had pushed the Panzerschiff through the Reichstag (national legislature), oth-
erwise had expressed often his critical attitude toward the buildup of the German 
High Seas Fleet before 1914.
In his reply to Groener’s question, “Does Germany need large warships?,” the 
chief of naval command, Adm. Erich Raeder (1876–1960), championed the earlier 
naval concept, which focused on a potential conflict with France and Poland.71 He 
argued that the attitude of the navy must not be determined by wishful thinking 
to reestablish itself as a major naval power. Its most important task in war was to 
prevent—at all costs—enemy forces from interdicting German SLOCs. World War 
I had proved the connection between German resistance at the home front and na-
val blockade: “Cutting off our sea lanes is the simplest and safest way, without any 
bloodshed, of defeating us. Our enemies know this as well. England has the most 
powerful fleet world-wide and its geographical position is disastrous for Germany. 
Therefore, any armed conflict has to be avoided that would turn England into one 
of our enemies. We would be doomed to failure right from the start.”72
Raeder’s memorandum concluded that the navy—without even considering the 
limits the peace treaty set—could fight the fleet only of a second-class sea power, 
such as France.
Naval Rearmament under Hitler, 1933–37
A few days after seizing power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) made 
it clear to naval and other military commanders that he intended to develop the 
armed forces into an instrument of his power politics. As far as the translation of 
this objective into armament was concerned, Hitler was initially cautious. As he 
explained in a speech on February 3, 1933: “The most dangerous period is that of 
rearmament. Then we shall see whether France has statesmen. If she does, she will 
not grant us time but will jump on us (presumably with eastern satellites).”73
The Reichsmarine (German Navy) had to make do with compromises regarding 
the displacement and armament of its future capital ships. However, in view of the 
anticipated long-term buildup of the fleet, these compromises seemed acceptable. 
The last of three Panzerschiffe was launched in June 1934. The next two units were 
upgraded to battle cruisers (31,000 tons, thirty-one knots, nine 28 cm guns) in an-
swer to the French battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg.74
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, allowed Germany to 
have a surface fleet with a tonnage up to 35 percent of that of the British Empire. 
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German naval leaders now believed they had attained their goal of “equal” rights. 
The 35 percent ceiling applied not just to total tonnage but to individual categories 
of warships. In the case of U-boats, Germany was allowed to achieve 45 percent 
at first, later 100 percent, of British submarine strength. In this context, Germany 
gave assurances that its navy would adhere to what were known as the “cruiser 
rules” regarding submarine warfare conducted against merchant shipping.75
The navy’s planning thus was based wholly on the structure of that of the other 
naval powers. Its motto was: What the other navies, with their rich traditions, con-
sider proper, and what Germany now is permitted within the 35 percent ceiling, is 
what Germany will build. The navy started to build a so-called normal fleet: fast 
capital ships, heavy and light cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and—for the 
first time after seventeen years—submarines. One week after the Anglo-German 
Naval Agreement was announced, the navy commissioned its first, small (250-ton) 
U-boat—thereby revealing its long-term secret preparatory activity in this area.76
Even if the U-boat had not been improved in basic ways since 1918, it had de-
veloped considerably in every direction (e.g., in its improved torpedoes, its mine-
laying ability, and its capacity to transmit and receive signals both while surfaced 
and while submerged). Nevertheless, opinion was widespread in all navies that 
the U-boat had lost the eminence it had achieved in World War I as one of the 
most effective naval weapons. The British Admiralty was convinced that asdic 
(a submarine location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine De-
tection Investigation Committee) had reduced the submarine threat almost to ex-
tinction. In contrast to this opinion, the small German U-boat staff, centered on 
Capt. Karl Dönitz (1891–1980), was convinced that antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 
weapons were greatly overrated and had not made decisive progress since 1918.77
From 1928 onward, Admiral Raeder determined the navy’s thinking. In study-
ing Germany’s World War I cruiser campaign, he had come to the conclusion that 
during the autumn of 1914 there had been a strategic correlation between the 
North Sea campaign and the operations of the cruiser squadrons in the Pacific and 
South Atlantic. Raeder realized that all naval theaters of war formed an intercon-
nected whole, so any operation had to be viewed in relation to those in other areas. 
Accordingly, he made overseas cruiser warfare and battle-fleet operations in home 
waters integral components of a single naval strategy that sought to exploit diver-
sionary effects, thereby exhausting the enemy’s forces and disrupting his supplies.78
Raeder formulated his strategic thinking most clearly in a briefing to Hitler on 
February 3, 1937. Analyzing Germany’s Great War experiences, he pointed out the 
correlation between strategy and a country’s military-geographical situation. Rae- 
der was aware of the likely “totality” of a future war—that it would be a struggle not 
just between forces but of “nation versus nation.” He emphasized the negative con-
sequences for Germany if it were unable to procure continually the raw materials it 
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lacked. In so doing, Raeder pointed out the glaring weaknesses in Germany’s war 
potential—but was unable to influence Hitler’s policy of confrontation.79
Buildup of the Navy against Britain, 1938–39
A fundamental change in strategic planning by the Kriegsmarine (as the German 
navy was known after 1935) commenced in spring 1938. As it became apparent 
that the Western powers opposed German expansion, Hitler issued a directive that 
all German war preparations should consider not only France and Russia but also 
Britain as potential enemies. A second confrontation with Britain now influenced 
all further planning for the next naval war. Raeder followed Hitler’s hazardous 
course of confrontation willingly, or at least without protest, in contravention 
of his strong statement on this matter to Groener in 1929. Raeder assumed— 
erroneously—that the navy would have several years of peace to continue its 
buildup.
In the summer of 1938, the naval staff produced a strategic study that concluded 
that, given a geographical starting position similar to that of 1914, only oceanic 
cruiser warfare, employing improved Panzerschiffe and U-boats, held any pros-
pect of success.80 Despite this realization, a planning committee of senior officers 
busied itself with the question of what tasks battleships could perform in a cruiser 
war in the Atlantic. The result was paradoxical and revealing: “The chief of staff of 
the naval staff concluded at the end of the discussion that all participants agreed 
that battleships were necessary, but that no consensus regarding their use could be 
achieved for the time being.”81
Traditionalists considered the most important arm of naval power to be capital 
ships. Focusing on them meant that the concept of sea control pushed the concept 
of sea denial into the background. Unlike the big-ship traditionalist Tirpitz, the 
naval staff during the 1930s had proposed a sea-denial strategy repeatedly. In con-
trast, the suggestion to develop a German strategy of sea control constituted a new, 
alternative approach to sea and world power in the twentieth century. In September 
1938, the commander in chief of the fleet, Adm. Rolf Carls (1885–1945), noted as 
follows: “If, in accordance with the will of the Führer, Germany is to achieve a firm 
world-power position, it will need, in addition to sufficient colonies, secure sea 
routes and access to the high seas. . . . A war against Britain means a war against 
the Empire, against France, probably also against Russia and a number of countries 
overseas, in other words against one-half or two-thirds of the whole world.”82
Nevertheless, Raeder was more inclined toward a sea-denial strategy via an oce-
anic cruiser campaign with Panzerschiffe, and he intended to give this strategy pri-
ority in the future armament program. However, by November 1938 he had been 
unable to gain Hitler’s support for his program. Hitler did not accept the cruiser 
warfare strategy, insisting instead that the navy step up the pace of its battleship 
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construction so that as soon as possible he would have at his disposal an instru-
ment of power he could employ globally.
The navy had to accept this decisive change. It formulated a new concept, the 
so-called Z-Plan, which centered on the construction of six capital ships by 1944. 
Additionally, battle cruisers, Panzerschiffe, aircraft carriers, fast light cruisers, and 
247 U-boats were to form the backbone of German naval forces for the future Battle 
of the Atlantic. On January 27, 1939, when Hitler ordered that the buildup of the 
navy was to take precedence over all other tasks, including the rearmament of the 
army and the Luftwaffe (air force), he heralded a gigantic buildup of naval forces. 
Within a few months, the planning of a series of six new-design, diesel-driven bat-
tleships was complete; the construction of two units began in the summer of 1939. 
In the meantime, on April 27, 1939, Hitler denounced the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement of 1935.83
The experiences of World War I acted as the starting point for developing the 
so-called pack tactics that German U-boats employed against enemy sea routes 
during World War II.84 Dönitz recognized that the concentration of merchant ship-
ping in convoys would require a similar concentration of U-boats to counter. And 
before the U-boats could attack a convoy, they needed to locate it—in other words, 
the problem of reconnaissance would have to be solved. In 1917–18, a number of 
U-boats had attacked successfully on the surface, under cover of darkness. During 
the evaluation of wartime experiences, former U-boat commanders recommended 
adoption and further development of this method of attack. Dönitz also had drawn 
attention to the advantages of night attacks in his book Die U-Bootswaffe, published 
in 1939. Nonetheless, later in World War II, this type of attack took British ASW 
defenses by surprise—they had relied too much on the supposed superiority of 
asdic. The escort forces were unable to cope with the German tactic, particularly as 
asdic had an effective range of no more than about 1,400 meters, which left it inef-
fective against U-boats operating on the surface.85
WORLD WAR II
Disillusionment came on September 3, 1939. Totally unexpectedly, Hitler ordered 
the navy to launch a naval war against Britain.86 The German navy was in no way 
prepared. Raeder’s initial estimate of the situation was very pessimistic, and he re-
signed himself to the realization that neither the few U-boats nor the surface forces 
would have any decisive effect on the outcome of the war: “They can do no more 
than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the 
foundations for later reconstruction.”87
However, the progress of the war soon demanded a new estimate of the situ-
ation. Nine months on, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands had been occupied; by June 22, 1940, France had suffered a total 
defeat. German naval control extended from Norway to the Pyrenees. Therefore, 
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the German naval staff switched to an offensive concept of naval warfare, aimed 
solely at destroying Britain’s maritime transport capacity. The Kriegsmarine’s sur-
face forces were insufficient for such a task; to supplement them, the navy concen-
trated on constructing and employing the means of naval warfare that had proved 
its worth during World War I—the U-boat.
The naval staff knew from its experience during the previous war that employ-
ment of the U-boat against the enemy’s merchant marine could be successful only 
if U-boats were deployed continuously along the enemy’s SLOCs, employing as 
many vessels as possible. The navy calculated that the number of U-boats perma-
nently at sea should range from 100 to 150 boats. Taking into consideration time 
for maintenance and resupply, this meant the navy needed approximately three 
hundred operational boats at its disposal.88 In the quest to achieve this, time was an 
important factor:
1.   In an economic war waged against a country that depended on supplies by 
sea, success could only be achieved in the long run. It was therefore a question 
of continuously weakening the enemy’s maritime transport capacity to an extent 
that exceeded the rate at which the enemy could construct new merchantmen.
2.   From the summer of 1940 onward, it became apparent that the British war 
effort increasingly was being supported by the resources of the United States. 
This made the naval staff intent on “putting Britain out of action soon, before 
the effects of even greater American aid made themselves felt.”89 
3.   Since it took around two years to construct a U-boat and bring it to opera-
tional status, amassing the numbers the navy envisaged so as to achieve the nec-
essary concentration of forces required plans to be made at a very early stage.90
While a numerically increasing U-boat fleet held out the prospect of German 
success, the naval staff had to take into account that the enemy, in view of the loom-
ing threat, would do everything he could to strengthen his ASW effort.
In October 1939, the naval command presented a U-boat buildup plan that set 
a monthly rate of twenty-nine boats. Hitler approved the plan; however, he refused 
to sanction priority, since he was at that time more concerned with the demands of 
the imminent land campaign against France.91 One year later, in November 1940, 
the navy had to realize that U-boat construction was being held up by shortages, 
and that the current building rate barely covered the current loss rate. The na-
val staff foresaw that there would be limits to the Reich’s material resources and 
production capacities. In December 1940, it viewed America’s growing support of 
Britain as a dangerous development “towards a marked prolongation of the war.” 
To the naval staff, this portended a “very negative effect on the overall German war 
strategy.”92 This statement expressed the simple, obvious fact that Germany could 
not win a prolonged war of attrition against the two Atlantic naval powers.
For this reason, in December 1940, Grand Admiral Raeder requested that Hit-
ler “recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power 
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against Britain.” To Raeder, this meant focusing air and naval forces against British 
supplies. The admiral was firmly convinced that U-boats were the decisive weapon 
to be used against Britain. Although Hitler did not reject Raeder’s view, he referred 
to the allegedly new political situation: the necessity “to eliminate at all cost the last 
enemy remaining [i.e., Soviet Russia] on the continent, before he can collaborate 
with Britain. . . . After that, everything can be concentrated on the needs of the 
Air Force and the Navy.”93 In Hitler’s eyes, Britain was not the enemy on which 
all weapons had to be concentrated, but a potential partner who might be made 
to “see reason” if an appropriate amount of military pressure were applied. Hitler 
also knew that a forced economic war could not lead to any marked success in one 
year. Furthermore, this kind of effort could increase the danger of the United States 
entering the war, something he sought to avoid at that point.94
In July 1941, after the first successes in the war against Russia, the naval staff 
tried to convince both the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) Command and Hitler of 
the immediate strategic necessity to concentrate on fighting the Anglo-Saxon naval 
powers. Analyzing the threat to which Germany was exposed, the naval staff por-
trayed the dilemma of a European continental state that lacked the vital elements of 
a naval power but was forced to fight against the greatest naval powers: “While in 
World War I we had the second strongest battle fleet in the world but no appropri-
ate operational base, we now dispose of a strategically favorable operational base, 
however, we do not have the required battle fleet to operate within the Atlantic.”95
The naval staff predicted that the two Allied naval powers would continue to 
fight, even if the Soviet Union collapsed, so they could reach their “final goal”: 
destroying Germany on the continent. The naval staff came to the conclusion that 
“the enemies’ prospect for the battle in the Atlantic for the year 1942 must be as-
sessed as favorable.” For this reason, the naval staff advocated that Germany bring 
about a decision in the Atlantic by taking advantage of both political assets (the 
cooperation of Vichy-France and Japan) and military assets (the concentrated em-
ployment of all available forces, in particular the U-boats and air forces).96
From 1940 onward, Germany possessed a good geographical position for naval 
warfare in the Atlantic, but this basis could not be exploited fully, owing to insuf-
ficient weaponry. The U-boat provided an effective weapon in the fight against 
enemy shipping up to 1942, but thereafter wider war demands, especially the criti-
cal situations in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front, forced the naval com-
mand to employ its last remaining offensive capability like an “operational fire 
brigade.”97 This led to enormous attrition, which was counterproductive to the stra-
tegic concept of mass concentration in the Atlantic. As the Allies developed better 
ASW weapons, the concept of a “U-boat war” failed in 1943 because the submarine 
had lost its ability to escape from enemy surveillance.
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In fact, the concept of attrition warfare began to fail by the fall of 1942 in the 
face of the mobilization of Allied resources and industrial capacities, especial-
ly those of the United States. The German naval staff analysis at that time of the 
accelerating buildup of Allied maritime transport capacity already revealed that 
the U-boats could not increase the monthly rate of sinkings to a level necessary 
to win the “tonnage race.” The naval staff delivered a pessimistic prognosis: “If, 
. . . considering the enemy’s rising production output, Germany wishes to diminish 
the enemy’s tonnage from the end of 1942 onwards to the same extent as is currently 
being achieved, ship sinkings per month will have to be increased to approximately 
1,300,000 GRT. Given the current situation, it is doubtful whether such a high rate 
of ship sinkings will be feasible for a sustained period of time.”98 Recalling the his-
torical argument that “no war in history . . . has yet been won by the use of one 
method of warfare,” the naval staff came around to an understanding that reflected 
actual conditions.99 By the end of 1942, German U-boats, as a realistic threat, had 
succumbed to the immense industrial capacity of the United States.
From 1943 onward, the navy had an officer at the helm, Grand Admiral Dönitz, 
who both was a charismatic leader and had close links to Hitler and Nazi ideology. 
Not until after Hitler’s death did he change “from the almost-blind tool of a crimi-
nal to the responsible soldier of the traditional Prussian school.”100 At that point he 
did everything in his power to end the already-lost war in a proper fashion and, at 
the same time, to evacuate as many people as possible across the Baltic to the West. 
The latter effort—the navy’s last wartime act—brought the service much positive 
postwar public recognition.101
Over the course of the twentieth century, Germany twice tried to force a strate-
gic decision, in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers, by cutting 
the Atlantic shipping routes. Both attempts ended in failure. The second defeat 
brought with it the end of the German Reich and the dissolution of all German 
armed forces.
BUILDING A NEW NAVY AFTER 1955
The Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to close 
integration of the new German armed forces into the Atlantic Alliance.102 Ten years 
after the surrender of Germany’s World War II forces, a new German naval force 
came into existence. The allied forces—especially the U.S. Navy, including its CNO, 
Adm. Arleigh Burke (1901–96)—supported its creation. During the first years of 
the buildup, a close cooperation and friendship developed between Admiral Burke 
and Vice Adm. Friedrich Ruge (1894–1985), the first head of the Federal German 
Navy (FGN).103
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Burke created a basis of confidence with his firm conviction that allied forces 
could fulfill their common tasks only if their cooperation were based on openness 
and mutual trust. Vice Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this basis of confi-
dence, which today is accepted as a matter of course.
This meant for the FGN, the smallest of the armed services within the FRG 
armed forces, that, for the first time in its history, the naval service was obliged 
merely to perform that function “which a German Navy can actually perform,” in 
close cooperation with the great maritime powers.104
At the same time the FRG joined NATO in May 1955, the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was integrated into the Warsaw Pact. The formation of light naval 
forces ensued, out of the Volkspolizei See (i.e., the national sea police force of the 
GDR) that had been in existence since 1950. In 1960, the GDR’s newly established 
forces were termed Volksmarine (People’s Navy), in commemoration of the 1918 
revolutionary tradition. This navy, which was strictly integrated within the ideo-
logical leadership claimed by the Communist Party, demonstrated little continuity 
with former German naval forces, whether in formation, structure, or mandate. 
Within the Warsaw Pact it evolved into an offensive naval force for use in confined 
and littoral waters. 
The two German naval forces exhibited great disparity until 1990. Each navy 
regarded the other as a potential military adversary in the context of the system of 
alliances. However, both were spared the necessity to prove their combat strength. 
With the reunification of the German republics in the fall of 1990, parts of each 
were incorporated into the German navy.105 
Today, the German navy has not only a lively interest in its history but a special 
relationship to it. A clear link can be seen between the historical self-understanding 
of its officers and the history of their service. In the past, this link often served only 
as an attempt to legitimize and secure the service’s position. The navy, which came 
into being in the mid-nineteenth century, often had to fight for recognition and 
even for its existence during a relatively short history. However, when historical 
interest is limited only to the navy and naval warfare, there is a danger that too little 
attention will be paid to the overlapping political correlations.
Nowadays the situation is different. Germany is one of the leading export nations 
in the world, and therefore extremely dependent on trade and the unhampered 
use of the high seas. This situation requires an understanding and an acceptance 
of the maritime domain as a vital Achilles’ heel for the prosperity of the German 
economy and society. This situation underlines the necessity for a well-balanced 
navy that is able to conduct demonstrations and to protect German maritime in-
terests, in cooperation with alliances and partners. The situation for the German 
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navy is much more comfortable at present than in previous eras, reinforcing its self- 
confidence; but a wider understanding of its roles is needed, now more than ever.
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Why in this age of constant technological, economic, social, and political change should navies actively concern themselves with the naval past? Herein I will try to answer this question, one often asked by skeptics 
anxious to insert into the developing courses of professional military education 
(PME) material that seems so much more relevant to the contemporary problems 
they face. The result easily can lead to efforts to cut history out of the syllabus 
or, more insidiously, to reduce it to the level where it becomes little more than a 
means of socializing new entrants and developing team spirit, necessary and laud-
able though those aims might be. After all, it has been said, with some justice, that 
a navy that does not know its history has no soul.1
I will start by reviewing some of the basic problems that today’s navies face. 
Then I will consider the contribution that naval history might make to dealing with 
those problems, first as a quarry of processed experience and second as an intellec-
tual exercise. Finally, I will seek to show the particular value of history in develop-
ing naval professionalism in a challenging social media age. By way of conclusion, I 
will look at some of the responsibilities that all this lays on historians.
CONTEXT: SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS FOR NAVIES
The basic point is that navies need to understand their function.2 This isn’t easy, 
these days. The potential tasks of navies have expanded, have grown more complex, 
and increasingly are seen as relatively more important, as the burgeoning navies 
of the Asia-Pacific region so amply demonstrate. For the navies of the twenty-first 
century, it is no longer enough to understand the war-fighting and deterrent war-
prevention roles, analyzed by the likes of Mahan and Corbett at the beginning of 
the last century, as they are affected by the international, technological, and social 
realities of this one. That is difficult enough.
Now we have to add a whole series of nontraditional, “postmodern” tasks as-
sociated with Maritime Security (with capital letters). These include the challenges 
presented by drug runners, trafficking in illegal migrants, international terrorism, 
humanitarian action, disaster relief, environmental protection, search and rescue, 
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capacity building, security sector reform, and so on. In many cases, early and ef-
fective engagement in these so-called Phase 0 activities will head off the need to 
exercise traditional war-fighting skills later on.3 But preparing for what the British 
military currently calls contingency is an inherently complicated business.4
One problem in the pursuit of guidance for making unavoidably difficult deci-
sions about relative operational priorities is that of having to “see through a glass 
darkly.” It is uniformly and intrinsically difficult for foreign ministries, treasur-
ies, or defense and naval staffs to predict the future or to gauge its requirements. 
This difficulty is demonstrated by the problems that all navies face these days in 
getting their kit because the lead times normally required to produce sophisti-
cated naval weapons, sensors, and platforms and their probable service lives are 
likely to be very long. A great many of the ships of the fleets of the 2030s are al-
ready at sea or at an advanced stage of design.5 This, together with rising costs 
and reduced budgets, makes the acquisition of naval matériel increasingly difficult. 
One set of victims of the procurement process (taking a leaf out of Jane Austen’s 
book) have remarked recently, “It is a truth universally acknowledged that de-
fence equipment acquisition is one of the most challenging of human activities . . . 
a uniquely demanding bureaucratic morass littered with military, technological, 
economic, and political pitfalls.”6
Future-oriented procurement strategies tend to suffer badly from the unpre-
dictability of the future economic, budgetary, and strategic environments. All too 
frequently, this development risk produces cycles of boom and bust that make sus-
tained planning over, say, a thirty-year period almost impossible for manufacturers 
and their customers. Typically, this will result in constant delays, cost increases, 
and iterative tinkering with original specifications—and eventually in the failure or 
chronic delay of the program in ways that mean that the navy tends to acquire new 
matériel in a piecemeal, opportunistic way rather than as part of an overall strate-
gic plan. This manner of acquisition may undermine a navy’s capacity to perform 
its present roles, not to mention its future ones. No navy has shown itself immune 
to such pressures and constraints; all navies need to be encouraged to think about 
how best to get around, if not to overcome, such difficulties.
Another problem is that, to some extent at least, the requirements of these pos-
sible contingency tasks conflict with those of the more familiar war-fighting ones. 
The funds expended on a carrier, for example, could generate any number of ca-
pable offshore patrol vessels. Again, the more sailors train for things such as the 
detection and apprehension of drug runners, the less they can train for antisubma-
rine operations. Given that resources, both human and material, are finite, choices 
have to be made.
Paradoxically, this is partly an unexpected product of success. Because of the 
fundamental flexibility of sea power, navies can deliver everything from bombs to 
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babies, so they often are called on to do more or less everything at sea and quite 
often on land as well. Since the world’s navies thus have shown themselves to be of 
such utility across the full spectrum of possible maritime operations, their success 
has increased the painful matter of operational and strategic choice dramatically in 
the setting of priorities for which they prepare. This is not an entirely new problem 
for them, of course, since navies always have had to take on functions other than 
those of simply obliterating one another, but there is a strong argument for saying 
that their resulting dilemmas of choice are much greater now than they ever have 
been before.
Worse still, all these possible roles and requirements are in a state of constant 
change. A force at sea, even one already engaged in prosecuting its dedicated mis-
sion, can find itself also having to confront and respond to a whole host of differ-
ent high- and low-intensity challenges across the spectrum, especially when, as 
they usually do, events combine to confound initial expectations about the nature 
and almost certainly the length of the original mission. As is so often said in such 
dynamic situations, it is unwise to assume your plan’s survival once contact with 
the problem is made. Thus when a number of Western powers thought they were 
intervening in the civil war in Libya in 2011 merely to avert a humanitarian crisis 
in Misrātah and elsewhere, the situation morphed into something much more de-
manding, which has yet to be resolved.
Mahan and Corbett do not seem to have much guidance to offer on such mat-
ters, because the focus of their thought was largely on higher-intensity operations, 
although they were perfectly well aware of the requirement for, and the potential 
challenge of, lower-intensity ones. They assumed that once a navy’s major high-end 
tasks were dealt with satisfactorily, the rest could look after itself. But now the “rest” 
quite often has become the major focus of concern.
This is because today’s situation has become more volatile, uncertain, com-
plex, and ambiguous (VUCA, for short!), partly because some of today’s lead-
ing states want it to be, and so pursue “a multidimensional and multidisciplinary 
strategy that consciously blurs the classical distinctions between warriors and 
non-combatants, front and rear, peace and war, state and proxies, and fact and 
fiction; and which employs a variety of tools—military technology and op-
erations, information and cyber, economic pressure, ethnic bridgeheads and 
sensitivities—in order to manipulate both rival societies and [the states’] own.”7 
Although such techniques are certainly not new, the extra attention they warrant 
today creates an ambiguous, confusing, and, frankly, potentially demoralizing situ-
ation. But if understood, they provide opportunities as well as challenges.
So how can the study of past events in naval history, as part of a well-rounded 
package of PME, possibly help navies prepare for the issues they will face? We 
will look at this from two different angles: naval history as a quarry of potentially 
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relevant data and—arguably more important, especially these days—naval history 
as an intellectual process.
THE POWER OF EXAMPLE FROM THE PROCESSED PAST
History is processed experience. Naval history is a source of innumerable examples 
of the way things have been done in the past. For all the historians’ reluctance to 
think of the lessons of history, or even their norms, the past is a source of previous 
experience that might well help present practitioners in comparable but not identi-
cal situations to understand their problems better and to think through what they 
should do to solve them.8 Although, as frequently has been said, history does not 
repeat itself—it rhymes.9 As Michael Howard reminded us back in 1962, there are 
patterns: “Wars still resemble each other more than they resemble any other human 
activity.”10 Naval professionals, arguably, should know those patterns, but in their 
search for what the Russians call the “norms” of military experience, or what they 
generally should expect, it is vital that they also should spot the differences as well 
as the similarities between their situation and perhaps only superficially similar 
ones in the processed past.
Looking at something such as the sinking of the Royal Navy’s Prince of Wales 
and Repulse off Malaya by Japanese aircraft in December 1941, for example, teaches 
us all sorts of things about the need for interservice cooperation, sustainable bal-
ances between resources and commitments, not underestimating your adversary, 
and so on. For all its dangers, not least the evident danger of mythmaking, there is 
much to be said for the simple notion of seeing the past as providing previous ex-
amples of the problems of the present and future.11 Such historical case studies are 
also ideal means for advancing understanding by way of counterfactual questions: 
What would have happened, for example, if the British in the autumn of 1941 had 
sent hundreds of tanks and aircraft to Singapore instead of to Russia? Why didn’t 
they?12
The point also can be exemplified by reverting to the problems of naval pro-
curement already discussed. While the past is indeed another country, today’s plan-
ners in the defense procurement field are facing problems and issues that are not 
that dissimilar from those faced by their predecessors. Those responsible for the 
design and procurement of today’s Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft carriers in the 
United Kingdom hardly can fail to have been aware of the demoralizing experience 
of their predecessors in the 1960s. This second time around, at the broadest level, 
the needs to be sufficiently clear about the projected roles of the ship, to keep un-
avoidable interservice competition down to manageable limits, and not to get too 
far away from what would seem to be financially viable in the circumstances of the 
time all seem to have been hoisted in.13 The difficulty of their task, though, clearly 
provides an incentive for growing the smart customer, and it is hard to avoid the 
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conclusion that study of the way in which such difficulties were handled in the past 
will provide at least some guidance for the present and the future.
Another area in which history as processed experience—a source of 
example—can be argued to have something to offer is in leadership. Leadership, 
of course, varies enormously in its character and its function. On the face of it, the 
kind of leadership required to command in battle is not necessarily the same as that 
required to lead a design team in a submarine-acquisition project or to run a shore 
establishment. But is that true? Again, looking at past examples of these kinds of 
leadership at the very least should encourage discussion and increase understand-
ing of this otherwise very slippery concept.14 In short, looking at previous examples 
of a campaign, problem, or issue enables people at least to ask the right questions 
and so to develop a broader understanding. It cannot be said too often that the dis-
similarities between the past and present cases are likely to be at least as important 
as the similarities in this process.
One of the reasons for this is the crucial role of the broader context in deter-
mining outcomes. For this reason, Michael Howard emphasizes the importance of 
studying history in context as well as in width and depth.15 Naval history can be a 
powerful way of reminding professionals of the importance of context, so it should 
be designed to encourage them to take a wider view of the impact of the interna-
tional, technological, social, and financial backgrounds to their operations. “Was 
the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 lost on the beaches of the peninsula or around the 
conference table in London?” is the sort of question that, as historians, we should 
be getting students to think about if they are to understand not only the purpose, 
planning, and conduct of operations but the management of defense more widely. 
Getting people to look above the parapet and not to be focused exclusively on the 
all-too-demanding problems of their part of the ship (to meld a few analogies, in 
the spirit of jointness) is, or should be, an essential objective of PME.
As an aside, it is also hard to think of an approach better designed to encour-
age reflection about the three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic— 
and the manner in which they interact. Encouraging students to track the conse-
quences of the strategic decision-making process in London all the way down to 
the deficiencies in preparation on the landing beaches of the Gallipoli Peninsula 
(such as the lack of sufficient medical facilities, water supply, and so forth) and then 
to follow the tactical consequences back up through the hierarchy of decision to 
those ultimately responsible for making strategic-level decisions hardly can fail to 
help develop a more rounded understanding of military operations.
The list of areas like this in which naval history as processed experience can 
provide helpful examples for constructive reflection by today’s warriors of course 
could go on almost indefinitely, but there’s also another aspect to history as a quarry 
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of illustrative, if not explanatory, material to be noted. That aspect is to consider the 
past as prologue to the present, and maybe to the future, too.
History helps us to understand the context and explains how we have arrived at 
where we are today, and therefore it also helps us to understand the present rather 
better, and from that to design sustainable policies for the future.16 Take, for ex-
ample, the increasingly contentious issue of the historic freedom of navigation for 
warships. Naval activity is, and always has been, framed by contemporary interpre-
tations of the law, and vice versa; understanding the background to those changing 
interpretations is an essential part of the professional sailor’s intellectual kit bag. 
Or at least it should be, if sailors are to hold their own in the expressions of differ-
ences of opinion at sea and in the defining of operational priorities. Arguably, the 
ability to comprehend, to deploy, and to make use of the law of the sea has become 
an ever-more-crucial component of twenty-first-century sea power. At all levels of 
command, understanding its development and its importance confers advantage.
At the moment, some aspects of this remain matters of contention as the U.S. 
Navy and other Western navies try to defend the basic notion of freedom of naviga-
tion against what they see as a continentalist tide that is seeking, in effect, to terri-
torialize the sea by insidiously claiming more and more jurisdiction over what once 
was regarded uniformly as the high seas. This has given rise to a host of regrettable 
incidents. All concerned in the matter of freedom of navigation, most particularly 
of warships, really need to understand the issues—what’s at stake, in other words—
and how this situation has arisen.
Knowing what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea says, for 
example, about the rights of warships in others’ exclusive economic zones is not 
enough, because the wording of the convention (being a political bargain) has 
enough ambiguity in it to allow (just about, and at a stretch) different interpreta-
tions—and there are strong operational and emotional reasons why some countries 
seek to exploit, or even ignore, vague or unhelpful provisions of the pact altogether. 
International law, after all, is nothing more than a set of political agreements that 
apply to a certain time and place, and is in any case susceptible to change through 
subsequent state practice. As one of its leading experts has remarked, “The history 
of the law of the sea has been dominated by a central and persistent theme—the 
competition between the exercise of governmental authority over the sea and the 
idea of the freedom of the seas. The tension between these has waxed and waned 
through the centuries, and has reflected the political, strategic, and economic cir-
cumstances of each particular age.”17
For this reason, simply knowing and enforcing the law are not enough. What 
navies ought to be doing as well is not just pontificating about what they think the 
law says on freedom of navigation for warships but explaining why upholding it is 
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a good thing for everyone. This task cannot be left to lawyers alone. Only naval his-
tory can show us exactly why this apparently arcane principle is important enough 
to risk lives for, and all concerned need to know it, not least those whose lives might 
in the present or future be in question because of it.
The same kind of developmental approach can be applied, of course, to all other 
aspects of sea power, in which knowing how we got to where we are provides prob-
able guidance to where we should go next; although sadly, but perhaps inevitably, 
lessons identified are not necessarily learned. This approach also has been lam-
pooned by skeptics who liken it to trying to drive down a twisting country road 
while peering through the back window of the car. This overstates the point. The 
truth is that when driving, while we look through the front windscreen most of the 
time, it’s good to keep an occasional eye on the rearview mirror as well.
Christopher Andrew, the historian of the British Security Service, has drawn 
attention to the lamentable consequences of such people not knowing their own 
history and identifies what he calls a “historical attention-span deficit disorder” 
(HASDD, for short) as the root cause of the problem. Hal Brands and William 
Inboden recently have done the same for those who would practice statecraft, ar-
guing the unwisdom of neglecting “a fount of information and insight for leaders 
grappling with the challenges of statecraft in a messy world.” But this argument 
should not be overdone either, for all but the most obsessive of historians would 
admit that history isn’t the only thing that matters.18
NAVAL HISTORY AS AN INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE
The second angle on the value of naval history for PME is not as a quarry of data, 
material, and example, but more as an intellectual discipline that encourages the 
development of thinking and of analytical, and very possibly behavioral, skills that 
should help make naval professionals smarter. As a former commandant at the U.K. 
Joint Service Command and Staff College (JSCSC) used to say, the modern airman, 
soldier, and sailor have to respond to perhaps unprecedented levels of strategic am-
biguity. They have to improvise creatively, as jazz musicians do around a central 
theme, responding dynamically to changes set by others and to the effects of con-
tingency, chance, and general chaos. No more can they fall back on the laboriously 
choreographed musical scores set by the kind of constantly rehearsed operational 
plans that characterized, for example, the Cold War.19
Instead they have to be prepared for surprise; as Mike Tyson once graphically 
remarked, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”20 Hence the 
need for what is described gruesomely as the end state of a student at the JSCSC: 
“to have developed a mind that is flexible and able to analyse and conceptualise in 
a military context in order to make timely and logical decisions in all types of sub-
sequent appointments.”21
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To cope with a complex and often bewildering future in which you easily can get 
punched in the mouth by unexpected events, those students will need the capacity 
to analyze incomplete and ambiguous data. They need to be able to think through 
problems and their consequences, and, most importantly, to keep thinking them 
through, long after their staff course, or indeed their latest operation, has ended. 
They need to be independent learners. Some at least of what is taught in a one-year 
staff course certainly will have a limited shelf life, because the world moves on. Ac-
cordingly, students have to be encouraged to develop the independent interest and 
the habits of thought and of continuing inquiry that animate the best historians. 
This helps produce that very necessary characteristic that some would call insight.22 
This can, and should, include as a “golden thread” a continuing interest in the naval 
past and its developing relationship with the naval present and the naval future.
Charles Darwin indeed reminds us that it was not necessarily the strongest but 
the most adaptable that won the evolutionary race. Naval history helps develop 
an openness of mind to uncomfortable ideas that confound and upset one’s own 
emerging conclusions. This really amounts to an early acceptance of the notion 
that there is no final and complete answer to anything. To paraphrase Napoléon, 
we have to tie knots and carry on, always progressing hopefully to what some have 
called a higher level of ignorance.23
In this, naval history can help, or maybe it should help, elevate thinking from 
the empirical to the conceptual—from the concerns of the tactical, technological 
nitty-gritty of yesterday’s or today’s battle to that wider, shaping context that links 
the levels of war and conflict. All the same, both the empirical and the conceptual 
are necessary parts of the mix. We should not, however, allow the perpetual fasci-
nation with the drums and smoke of battle to obscure the more-abstract realities 
that in many cases determine outcomes. Naval history, in short, can and should 
help us understand the critical business of strategy and policy making.24
Using history in this way is a much more widely practiced activity than is of-
ten realized. By the time strategists and policy makers have reached such elevated 
positions, they have engaged with history, absorbing views about the relevance of 
the past, even if only through a process of osmosis. Either consciously or uncon-
sciously, they use history as a guide for how to think about future policy in a whole 
variety of ways.25 The design teams developing the Royal Navy’s Type 26 global 
combat ship or those responsible for shaping a navy’s training programs cannot in-
sulate themselves from the past, however hard they may try. They adapt and adopt 
its conceptual consequences as they both reflect and help create strategic thinking, 
in a continuous iterative cycle of reflection and action. It is quite likely that in many 
cases they do not realize they are doing it! Internet bloggers and the young naval 
enthusiasts who come together to create online think tanks such as the Center for 
International Maritime Security, on the other hand, do so quite consciously, aiming 
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to study the past as a guide to the future, and their influence undoubtedly will seep 
out in all directions. History, in short, is unavoidable, and it shapes not just conclu-
sions but also approaches and ways of thinking. The real question is not whether to 
admit its relevance to today’s problems but how to make the best use of it.
For all that, unfortunately, a sizable constituency of thought in the United King-
dom felt bound to react to what they considered to be Britain’s frankly embar-
rassing Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010 with the fear that 
the country was no longer capable of “doing” strategy, or even thinking about it 
constructively—an impression apparently confirmed, in their minds at least, by the 
experience of the later stage of the second Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This concern 
was triggered initially by the Royal United Services Institute address of December 
2009 by the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, 
in which he claimed that Britain had lost the habit of making strategy.
But one thing that’s struck me in my present role, and that I think requires urgent action 
over the next year, is the degree to which we seem to have lost an institutionalised capacity 
for, and culture of, strategic thought. I’m not saying that we don’t have people who can think 
strategically, or that we haven’t evolved a proper strategic basis for our actions. But we’ve 
seized on ability where we’ve found it, and as a result our formulation of strategy has been 
much harder than should have been the case. We’ve been hunter/gatherers of strategic talent, 
rather than nurturers and husbandmen.26
It was followed up through a series of inquiries by the House of Commons Pub-
lic Administration Select Committee and highly critical articles from a large num-
ber of academics. Their concerns were reinforced by the uncertain consequences of 
Britain’s engagement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The suggestion was that the 
United Kingdom had not thought through what its involvement in these wars was 
supposed to achieve, nor the requirements or likely consequences of this involve-
ment, largely because it had lost the habit of consulting the rearview mirror and 
developing the agnostic and questioning ways of thought that develop from that. 
Did anyone ask for evidence that Britain’s intervention in the intense factionalism 
of Afghanistan would be any more successful this time than it had been the first, 
second, and third times that Britain had tried it?27
While the urgency of the need to cut government expenditure and to require the 
Ministry of Defence to start filling in the “black hole” in its finances perhaps offers 
some excuse for the failings of the SDSR, this is less true of Britain’s operational fail-
ings. These are hard to explain except in terms of the speed of events to which the 
United Kingdom felt it must respond (allowing insufficient time for consultation 
and strategic reflection) and, perhaps, the lack of defense experience among the 
political class. Nor is the quality of the advice that the military offers to ministers 
exempt from academic and insider criticism.28
Nor, sadly, is this inability to do strategy all that uncommon. A good case can 
be made that it applied to the Germans and especially the Japanese in the Second 
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World War; they managed to combine tactical and operational brilliance with a 
strategic insouciance in a manner that now appears quite breathtaking. The point is 
that failing to take full advantage of what the historical approach has to offer means 
missing a chance to reduce the prospects of strategic failure.
But once again, how, more exactly, can history help? Such help probably lies 
much less in the delivery of the facts, or answers, and prescriptions for the future 
than in identifying the questions about strategy that those conducting it, or those 
trying to understand it, should ask. A brilliant recent review of four very good 
books about the causes of the First World War (a subject one might think conclu-
sively studied for a century now) found that “they [did] not even come close to 
agreeing . . . [and that] historical consensus on the causes of the First World War 
appears no closer than it was 50 or 75 years ago, nor does it appear a shared view 
will ever be achieved. . . . This means we must be both cautious and humble when 
generalizing about war and peace and making policy recommendations based on 
our understanding of the conflict.”29 Much the same, if on a less elevated plane, still 
could be said about interpretations of the course and consequence of the Battle 
of Jutland and a host of other such familiar naval subjects. The Dutch historian 
Pieter Geyl made the essential point that “history is argument without end.”30 But 
this is not an apology. In the training it provides for the kind of intellectual dialec-
tic of argument and counterargument that deepens understanding, history makes 
a major contribution to our capacity to analyze.
Lawrence Freedman, in his recent magisterial book on strategy, makes a simi-
lar point.31 The intrinsic diversity and ambiguity of our subject—the conduct of 
military operations, not least at sea—mean that it is very easy to get things funda-
mentally wrong, but it is sadly hard to get them right, and harder still to achieve an 
overall consensus on what is right and what is wrong. Analyzing past examples to 
see whether we can work out why some things went well and some did not at least 
should identify the questions that we, or anyone else trying to do strategy or to 
make policy in the naval realm, should be asking. In this, the process of naval his-
tory—the asking of questions, the analysis of data, and the testing of hypotheses—
is more important than the product, the answers. Making the journey, in other 
words, can be more useful than arriving at the destination. This is what Dwight D. 
Eisenhower meant when he famously observed regarding preparing for battle, “I 
have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”32
TRUTH DECAY
There is now—in the age of all-pervasive social media—one final justification for 
naval people to have more than a passing familiarity with the disciplines of naval 
history. That is the contemporary phenomenon of what some have called truth 
decay.33 By this they mean the impact that easy accessibility to and the potentially 
overwhelming power of social media is having on people’s trust in authority and 
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in traditional forms of expertise. Imperfectly controlled, this platform empowers 
cranks, bigots, and those who willfully would deceive by according them the same 
apparent status as experts. “Don’t you see,” asks one of the characters in George 
Orwell’s novel 1984, “that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of 
thought?”34 It is increasingly difficult for people, deluged with showers of contra-
dictory information, deliberate misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theo-
ries, to know what to believe, which encourages them to fall back on that very 
human trait of believing what they want to believe and forming up into dissonant 
tribes, unable to relate to, or even understand, the others.
Collectively, this threatens the social order. Some would go further: “We are 
facing nothing less than a crisis in our democracy based on the systematic ma-
nipulation of data to support the relentless targeting of citizens, without their 
consent, by campaigns of disinformation and messages of hate.”35 In the words 
of the recently released European Union code on dealing with disinforma-
tion, “open and democratic societies depend on public debates that allow well- 
informed citizens to express their will through free and fair political processes.”36
As citizens, naval personnel and navies in general are as vulnerable to this as any 
other social group—perhaps more so given their generally very high level of com-
puter literacy and the stringent time demands of their profession. As ordinary citi-
zens, they too have an interest in the general well-being of the society in which they 
live and that they try to protect against more-traditional forms of threat. Moreover, 
whether they like it or not, they are living in a world of competing narratives than 
can often be state directed.37
Illustrating the point, in 2009 the Kremlin established the “Commission to Pre-
vent the Falsification of History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests” to counter 
Baltic and central European narratives about Soviet occupation and wartime col-
laboration.38 For its part, Singapore has established a “Select Committee on Delib-
erate Online Falsehoods,” thinking it is important to support social cohesion by 
cultivating an informed public and encouraging a culture of fact-checking.39 Stay-
ing afloat in this whirlpool of conflicting currents requires a continued capacity for 
independent judgment. Navy people (whose basic job is to defend the states and 
the societies that pay for those navies) also may be thought to have an even greater 
incentive than ordinary citizens to be at least aware of, and ideally able to help to 
defeat, these insidious challenges to domestic stability.
Moreover, navies themselves are vulnerable to such campaigns of targeted dis-
information. Their missions and activities can be traduced by adversaries, with del-
eterious impacts on public esteem and their operational effect.40 More sinister and 
dangerous still, sailors—often living a tight shipboard life, even ashore—always 
have proved vulnerable to the effects of uninformed gossip. In these continuing 
circumstances it is easy to imagine the possibilities of greater access to social media 
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morphing into a kind of mega-scuttlebutt, with possibly disastrous consequences 
for a navy’s cohesiveness and morale. For the same reason, this could be a signifi-
cant target of opportunity for imaginative adversaries, both foreign and domestic. 
Thus, it does not seem unreasonable for navies to regard this possibility as a new 
battleground for them to take seriously.
Once again, how might a familiarity with naval history, both as processed ex-
perience and as an intellectual discipline, offer some modest help against these po-
tentially ominous developments? It will be modest, because in an age when most 
people get their news from Facebook and Twitter feeds, and in which traditional 
journalism may well be in terminal decline, this is a fundamental problem way 
beyond easy solutions.41 But nonetheless, for naval personnel, history may help a 
little. First, perhaps history can show that this is an old, almost-familiar problem, 
now reappearing in a new and potentially more virulent form. This could be done, 
for example, by looking at the role of misinformation in naval mutinies and other 
such disasters, as a way of alerting naval personnel to the dangers they confront, 
and maybe to ways of dealing with them—or even employing them against their 
adversaries.42
More importantly, perhaps, the discipline of history itself encourages open-
mindedness, the careful weighing of evidence, and the asking of questions, and it 
provides other such intellectual defenses when confronted with purported infor-
mation and what very well could prove to be fake news. Any kind of serious study 
could serve this function, of course, but naval history is more accessible and, for 
other reasons discussed earlier, is especially relevant to the naval profession.
While much of what has been said may be true for all disciplines and subject areas 
and for all types of history, for national leaders, strategic decision makers, and op-
erational commanders, the obvious salience of specifically naval history for sailors, 
given the undeniable continuities of operations at sea over the centuries, means 
naval history is particularly useful in this regard. Moreover, for sailors at all levels, 
naval history, whether conscious and constructed or not, is unavoidable. Whatever 
historians might think of it, naval students, strategists, and policy makers will go on 
using what they at least think is history as a guide to future behavior.
This being the case, it lays considerable responsibility on naval historians. First, 
as John Hattendorf has reminded us, historians need to recognize that their subject 
does not end in 1945 or with the closing of the Cold War (assuming that conflict 
has even ended!).43 History is yesterday as well. This poses unavoidable evidential 
problems. Analysis, therefore, has to be preceded by the availability of primary ma-
terial. In any case, much of what in the past would have produced survivable paper 
copies (or much less survivable photostats) now appears only as transitory e-mails, 
exchanges in chat rooms, and so on. Since “recovering the unrecorded past” is at 
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least as important as it was, tomorrow’s historians and their naval students will 
need their twenty-first-century skills as well as the more traditional ones employed 
by yesterday’s historians.44
Second, historians need to encourage their navies to be receptive to the past, to 
preserve and process the records (or what these days passes for records) of what 
they have done to build a bank of experience for the future. They need to nurture 
those veterans who actually had that experience and are willing to talk about it, if 
they only had the encouragement to do so. The results of this testimony need to 
be preserved in accessible form and made available for appropriate use. Today’s 
practitioners need to know that something similar to their current preoccupations 
probably has happened before.45
Third, historians need to encourage thinking about things in the round: paying 
due regard to context and avoiding narrow fixations on monocausal explanations. 
They need to understand the technological and logistical realities of what it is actu-
ally like to be at sea—hence the particular value of ex-sailors who are also histori-
ans. They also need to avoid unconscious hindsight and to sympathize with their 
subjects, who clearly could not enjoy its advantages.
Fourth, they need to ensure that what they deliver is accessible, interesting, and 
even enjoyable. My experience at a variety of service educational establishments is 
that naval students usually do rather enjoy doing naval history—or at least freely 
concede that they found that engaging in a modicum of historical research was 
worthwhile. In this, historians are likely to be pushing on an open door; at the very 
least, they should do everything possible to stop it from shutting. One way of doing 
this is to ask the speculative “What if?” counterfactual questions referred to earlier. 
The process of isolating and altering one variable in the historic equation invites 
speculation about the difference it could have made to some past and completed 
event, and often will stimulate both insight into and enthusiasm for the subject.
Finally, they should make their subject policy relevant, wherever possible. For 
some this will be difficult. Some historians, knowing how their findings can be 
distorted to suit a different time, seek—for the best of professional reasons—to 
insulate their discipline from the contaminating fingers of strategists and policy 
makers and would have nothing to do with their world. However understandable, 
this purist approach is unwise for all but a few keepers of the sacred flame.
The pressure of other urgent PME requirements means the default position of 
those responsible for its implementation is all too likely to reduce the teaching of 
history as much as possible. The long and generally depressing story of the Royal 
Navy’s neglect or misuse, or both, of its own really rather spectacular history (and 
its sometimes dire operational consequences) unfortunately illustrates the point.46 
Historians need to counter this modernist tendency to the extent they can.
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In sum, history, similar to the poor and taxes, is always with us, whether we like 
it or know it or not. We cannot avoid it. This being so, it is plainly the duty of naval 
historians to do their best to ensure that what they deliver is valid as both processed 
experience and an intellectual discipline. They owe this to the future as much as to 
the past.
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